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Message-Id: <20230831113803.910630-2-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
Date:   Thu, 31 Aug 2023 13:37:59 +0200
From:   Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
To:     viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, brauner@...nel.org,
        chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, neilb@...e.de,
        kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
        zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
        paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
        dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
        stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
        casey@...aufler-ca.com
Cc:     linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        selinux@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 21/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>

Remove hardcoded IMA function calls (not for appraisal) from the LSM
infrastructure, the VFS, NFS and the key subsystem.

Make those functions as static (except for ima_file_check() which is
exported, and ima_post_key_create_or_update(), which is not in ima_main.c),
and register them as implementation of the respective hooks in the new
function init_ima_lsm().

Call init_ima_lsm() from integrity_lsm_init() (renamed from
integrity_iintcache_init()), to make sure that the integrity subsystem is
ready at the time IMA hooks are registered. The same will be done for EVM,
by calling init_evm_lsm() just after init_ima_lsm().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
---
 fs/file_table.c                   |  2 -
 fs/namei.c                        |  7 ---
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c                     |  7 ---
 fs/open.c                         |  1 -
 include/linux/ima.h               | 94 -------------------------------
 security/integrity/iint.c         |  7 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  6 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 63 ++++++++++++++-------
 security/integrity/integrity.h    |  9 +++
 security/keys/key.c               |  9 +--
 security/security.c               | 53 +++--------------
 11 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 964e24120684..7b9c756a42df 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/task_work.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 
@@ -376,7 +375,6 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
 	locks_remove_file(file);
 
 	security_file_pre_free(file);
-	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
 		if (file->f_op->fasync)
 			file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index efed0e1e93f5..a200021209c3 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -3636,8 +3635,6 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
 		error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
 	if (!error)
 		error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode);
-	if (!error)
-		error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
 	if (!error && do_truncate)
 		error = handle_truncate(idmap, file);
 	if (unlikely(error > 0)) {
@@ -3701,7 +3698,6 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 	}
 	security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, dir, file, mode);
-	ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, dir, file, mode);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -4049,9 +4045,6 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode,
 		case 0: case S_IFREG:
 			error = vfs_create(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
 					   dentry, mode, true);
-			if (!error)
-				ima_post_path_mknod(idmap, &path, dentry,
-						    mode_stripped, dev);
 			break;
 		case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK:
 			error = vfs_mknod(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 3450bb1c8a18..94bbd7ac8b68 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/jhash.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -868,12 +867,6 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
 		goto out_nfserr;
 	}
 
-	host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags);
-	if (host_err) {
-		fput(file);
-		goto out_nfserr;
-	}
-
 	if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE)
 		file->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH;
 	else
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 0c55c8e7f837..6825ac1d07a9 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/falloc.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/dnotify.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 6e4d060ff378..58591b5cbdb4 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -16,26 +16,7 @@ struct linux_binprm;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
 extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void);
-extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
-extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				    struct inode *dir, struct file *file,
-				    umode_t mode);
-extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
-extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
-		      unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
-extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-			      enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
-extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
-			 bool contents);
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_read_file_id id);
-extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-				umode_t mode, unsigned int dev);
 extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
 extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
 extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
@@ -60,72 +41,11 @@ static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
 	return HASH_ALGO__LAST;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-					   struct inode *dir,
-					   struct file *file,
-					   umode_t mode)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-				    unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-				     enum kernel_load_data_id id,
-				     char *description)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
-				bool contents)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
-				     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				       const struct path *dir,
-				       struct dentry *dentry,
-				       umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
 static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -176,20 +96,6 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
 {}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
-extern void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
-					  struct key *key,
-					  const void *payload, size_t plen,
-					  unsigned long flags, bool create);
-#else
-static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
-						 struct key *key,
-						 const void *payload,
-						 size_t plen,
-						 unsigned long flags,
-						 bool create) {}
-#endif  /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
 extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
 extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index a462df827de2..32f0f3c5c4dd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -167,20 +167,21 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
 }
 
-static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
+static int __init integrity_lsm_init(void)
 {
 	iint_cache =
 	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
 			      0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
+
+	init_ima_lsm();
 	return 0;
 }
 DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
 	.name = "integrity",
-	.init = integrity_iintcache_init,
+	.init = integrity_lsm_init,
 	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
 };
 
-
 /*
  * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c29db699c996..c0412100023e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
 static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+				   const void *payload, size_t plen,
+				   unsigned long flags, bool create);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
  * platform native format.  The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f8581032e62c..0e4f882fcdce 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
  */
-void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -413,8 +413,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 	int ret;
@@ -452,8 +452,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
  *
  * On mprotect change success, return 0.  On failure, return -EACESS.
  */
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
-		      unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
 	struct file *file;
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -673,9 +673,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
  * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
  * tmpfiles are in policy.
  */
-void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			     struct inode *dir, struct file *file,
-			     umode_t mode)
+static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
+				    struct file *file, umode_t mode)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -710,9 +709,9 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
  * file data can be written later.
  */
-void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			 const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-			 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
+static void __maybe_unused
+ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *dir,
+		    struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -751,8 +750,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
-		  bool contents)
+static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+			 bool contents)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -801,8 +800,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -835,7 +834,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
 
@@ -889,9 +888,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
-		       char *description)
+static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+			      char *description)
 {
 	if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -1120,4 +1119,28 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 	return error;
 }
 
+static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_pre_free_security, ima_file_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
+#endif
+};
+
+void __init init_ima_lsm(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), "integrity");
+}
+
 late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 7167a6e99bdc..7adc7d6c4f9f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 
 /* iint action cache flags */
 #define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
@@ -191,6 +192,14 @@ extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
 
 struct modsig;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+void __init init_ima_lsm(void);
+#else
+static inline void __init init_ima_lsm(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 0f9c6faf3491..2acf9fa80735 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -936,8 +935,6 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
 					   true);
-	ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
-				      flags, true);
 
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 
@@ -969,13 +966,9 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
 
-	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 		security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
 						   flags, false);
-		ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key,
-					      payload, plen,
-					      flags, false);
-	}
 
 	goto error_free_prep;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e6783c2f0c65..8c5b8ffeef92 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1098,12 +1098,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
  */
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2793,13 +2788,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
+			     flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2828,12 +2818,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3163,12 +3148,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
 			      bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 
@@ -3188,12 +3168,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
@@ -3208,12 +3183,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
  */
 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_load_data(id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
 
@@ -3235,13 +3205,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_load_data_id id,
 				   char *description)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
-			    description);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
+			     description);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
 
-- 
2.34.1

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