linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v12 18/33] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for private memory

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <ZQRpiOd1DNDDJQ3r@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 15 Sep 2023 07:26:16 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
        Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
        Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@...nel.org>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        Anup Patel <anup@...infault.org>,
        Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
        Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
        "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@...radead.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
        linux-mips@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        kvm-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
        Fuad Tabba <tabba@...gle.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
        Anish Moorthy <amoorthy@...gle.com>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>,
        Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@...el.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
        Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>,
        Maciej Szmigiero <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Wang <wei.w.wang@...el.com>,
        Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@...cle.com>,
        Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...il.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v12 18/33] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for private memory

On Fri, Sep 15, 2023, Yan Zhao wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 13, 2023 at 06:55:16PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> ....
> > +static void kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > +					      struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> > +{
> > +	kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
> > +				      PAGE_SIZE, fault->write, fault->exec,
> > +				      fault->is_private);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int kvm_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > +				   struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> > +{
> > +	int max_order, r;
> > +
> > +	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(fault->slot)) {
> > +		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
> > +		return -EFAULT;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	r = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, fault->slot, fault->gfn, &fault->pfn,
> > +			     &max_order);
> > +	if (r) {
> > +		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
> > +		return r;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	fault->max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(max_order),
> > +			       fault->max_level);
> > +	fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY);
> > +
> > +	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
> > +}
> > +
> >  static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> >  {
> >  	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;
> > @@ -4293,6 +4356,14 @@ static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
> >  			return RET_PF_EMULATE;
> >  	}
> >  
> > +	if (fault->is_private != kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, fault->gfn)) {
> In patch 21,
> fault->is_private is set as:
> 	".is_private = kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, cr2_or_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT)",
> then, the inequality here means memory attribute has been updated after
> last check.
> So, why an exit to user space for converting is required instead of a mere retry?
> 
> Or, is it because how .is_private is assigned in patch 21 is subjected to change
> in future? 

This.  Retrying on SNP or TDX would hang the guest.  I suppose we could special
case VMs where .is_private is derived from the memory attributes, but the
SW_PROTECTED_VM type is primary a development vehicle at this point.  I'd like to
have it mimic SNP/TDX as much as possible; performance is a secondary concern.

E.g. userspace needs to be prepared for "spurious" exits due to races on SNP and
TDX, which this can theoretically exercise.  Though the window is quite small so
I doubt that'll actually happen in practice; which of course also makes it less
important to retry instead of exiting.