linux-kernel - [tip: x86/bugs] x86/srso: Remove 'pred

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Message-ID: <169511719158.27769.3337585251495698419.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date:   Tue, 19 Sep 2023 09:53:11 -0000
From:   "tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To:     linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/srso: Remove 'pred_cmd' label

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     73163764dd8d117f2ffa14c0bc816bf1bf8a0e27
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/73163764dd8d117f2ffa14c0bc816bf1bf8a0e27
Author:        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 04 Sep 2023 22:04:57 -07:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CommitterDate: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 11:42:47 +02:00

x86/srso: Remove 'pred_cmd' label

SBPB is only enabled in two distinct cases:

1) when SRSO has been disabled with srso=off

2) when SRSO has been fixed (in future HW)

Simplify the control flow by getting rid of the 'pred_cmd' label and
moving the SBPB enablement check to the two corresponding code sites.
This makes it more clear when exactly SBPB gets enabled.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bb20e8569cfa144def5e6f25e610804bc4974de2.1693889988.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e45dd69..4f1ad23 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2410,13 +2410,21 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	bool has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
 
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
-		goto pred_cmd;
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		return;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO)) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
+			x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
+		return;
+	}
 
 	if (has_microcode) {
 		/*
 		 * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
 		 * IBPB microcode has been applied.
+		 *
+		 * Zen1/2 don't have SBPB, no need to try to enable it here.
 		 */
 		if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
@@ -2439,7 +2447,9 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	switch (srso_cmd) {
 	case SRSO_CMD_OFF:
-		goto pred_cmd;
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
+			x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
+		return;
 
 	case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE:
 		if (has_microcode) {
@@ -2501,11 +2511,6 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 
 out:
 	pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
-
-pred_cmd:
-	if ((!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) &&
-	     boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
-		x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt