linux-kernel - [PATCH v11 22/37] x86/fred: Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task

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Message-Id: <20230923094212.26520-23-xin3.li@intel.com>
Date:   Sat, 23 Sep 2023 02:41:57 -0700
From:   Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
To:     linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-edac@...r.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org
Cc:     tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
        luto@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
        peterz@...radead.org, jgross@...e.com, ravi.v.shankar@...el.com,
        mhiramat@...nel.org, andrew.cooper3@...rix.com,
        jiangshanlai@...il.com, nik.borisov@...e.com
Subject: [PATCH v11 22/37] x86/fred: Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task

From: "H. Peter Anvin (Intel)" <hpa@...or.com>

Entering a new task is logically speaking a return from a system call
(exec, fork, clone, etc.). As such, if ptrace enables single stepping
a single step exception should be allowed to trigger immediately upon
entering user space. This is not optional.

NMI should *never* be disabled in user space. As such, this is an
optional, opportunistic way to catch errors.

Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task, thus once
the new task enters user space, single-step trap and NMI are both
enabled immediately.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@...or.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
---

Changes since v8:
* Use high-order 48 bits above the lowest 16 bit SS only when FRED
  is enabled (Thomas Gleixner).
---
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 4f87f5987ae8..c075591b7b46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include <asm/resctrl.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 #include <asm/fsgsbase.h>
+#include <asm/fred.h>
 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
 /* Not included via unistd.h */
 #include <asm/unistd_32_ia32.h>
@@ -528,7 +529,7 @@ void x86_gsbase_write_task(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long gsbase)
 static void
 start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
 		    unsigned long new_sp,
-		    unsigned int _cs, unsigned int _ss, unsigned int _ds)
+		    u16 _cs, u16 _ss, u16 _ds)
 {
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != current_pt_regs());
 
@@ -545,11 +546,36 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
 	loadsegment(ds, _ds);
 	load_gs_index(0);
 
-	regs->ip		= new_ip;
-	regs->sp		= new_sp;
-	regs->cs		= _cs;
-	regs->ss		= _ss;
-	regs->flags		= X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+	regs->ip	= new_ip;
+	regs->sp	= new_sp;
+	regs->csx	= _cs;
+	regs->ssx	= _ss;
+	/*
+	 * Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task, thus
+	 * once the new task enters user space, single-step trap and NMI
+	 * are both enabled immediately.
+	 *
+	 * Entering a new task is logically speaking a return from a
+	 * system call (exec, fork, clone, etc.). As such, if ptrace
+	 * enables single stepping a single step exception should be
+	 * allowed to trigger immediately upon entering user space.
+	 * This is not optional.
+	 *
+	 * NMI should *never* be disabled in user space. As such, this
+	 * is an optional, opportunistic way to catch errors.
+	 *
+	 * Paranoia: High-order 48 bits above the lowest 16 bit SS are
+	 * discarded by the legacy IRET instruction on all Intel, AMD,
+	 * and Cyrix/Centaur/VIA CPUs, thus can be set unconditionally,
+	 * even when FRED is not enabled. But we choose the safer side
+	 * to use these bits only when FRED is enabled.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+		regs->fred_ss.swevent	= true;
+		regs->fred_ss.nmi	= true;
+	}
+
+	regs->flags	= X86_EFLAGS_IF | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
 }
 
 void
-- 
2.34.1