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Date:   Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:23:04 +1000
From:   Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
To:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH kernel] x86/compressed/64: reduce #VC nesting for
 intercepted CPUID for SEV-SNP guest


On 25/9/23 18:41, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com> wrote:
> 
>> For certain intercepts an SNP guest uses the GHCB protocol to talk to
>> the hypervisor from the #VC handler. The protocol requires a shared page so
>> there is one per vCPU. In case NMI arrives in a middle of #VC or the NMI
>> handler triggers a #VC, there is another "backup" GHCB page which stores
>> the content of the first one while SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE is sent.
>> The vc_raw_handle_exception() handler manages main and backup GHCB pages
>> via __sev_get_ghcb/__sev_put_ghcb.
>>
>> This works fine for #VC and occasional NMIs. This does not work so fine if
>> the #VC handler causes intercept + another #VC, if NMI arrives during
>> the second #VC, there are no more pages for SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE.
>> The problem place is the #VC CPUID handler. Running perf in the SNP guest
>> crashes with:
>>
>> Kernel panic - not syncing: Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use
>>
>> vc_raw_handle_exception #1: exit_code 72 (CPUID) eax d ecx 1
>> We lock the main GHCB and while it is locked we get to
>> snp_cpuid_postprocess() which executes "rdmsr" of MSR_IA32_XSS==0xda0 which
>> triggers:
>>
>> vc_raw_handle_exception #2: exit_code 7c (MSR) ecx da0
>> Here we lock the backup ghcb.
>>
>> And then PMC NMI comes which cannot complete as there is no GHCB page left
>> to use:
>>
>> CPU: 5 PID: 566 Comm: touch Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2-aik-ad9c-g7413e71d3dcf-dirty #27
>> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown unknown
>> Call Trace:
>>   <NMI>
>>   dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x60
>>   panic+0x222/0x310
>>   ____sev_get_ghcb+0x21e/0x220
>>   __sev_es_nmi_complete+0x28/0xf0
>>   exc_nmi+0x1ac/0x1c0
>>   end_repeat_nmi+0x16/0x67
>> ...
>>   </NMI>
>>   <TASK>
>>   vc_raw_handle_exception+0x9e/0x2c0
>>   kernel_exc_vmm_communication+0x4d/0xa0
>>   asm_exc_vmm_communication+0x31/0x60
>> RIP: 0010:snp_cpuid+0x2ad/0x420
>>
>> Drop one #VC by replacing "rdmsr" with GHCB's VMGEXIT to read the value from
>> the hypervisor.
>>
>> Fixes: ee0bfa08a345 ("x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers")
>> Cc: x86@...nel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@....com>
>> ---
>>
>> This is made on top of (which has the "efi/unaccepted: Make sure unaccepted table is mapped"
>> fix for booting SNP):
>> b996cbe1203c (tip/master) 15 hours ago Ingo Molnar Merge branch into tip/master: 'x86/tdx'
>>
>> plus:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a5856fa1ebe3879de91a8f6298b6bbd901c61881.1690578565.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com/
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
>>   1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
>> index e73c90c9cc5b..399219de5a9b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
>> @@ -477,11 +477,19 @@ static int snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
>>   		if (leaf->subfn == 1) {
>>   			/* Get XSS value if XSAVES is enabled. */
>>   			if (leaf->eax & BIT(3)) {
>> -				unsigned long lo, hi;
>> -
>> -				asm volatile("rdmsr" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)
>> -						     : "c" (MSR_IA32_XSS));
>> -				xss = (hi << 32) | lo;
>> +				/*
>> +				 * Since we're here, it is SNP and rdmsr will trigger
>> +				 * another #VC and waste one of just two GHCB pages.
>> +				 * Skip the intercept and do direct hypercall.
>> +				 */
>> +				ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, MSR_IA32_XSS);
>> +				if (sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MSR, 0, 0) != ES_OK)
>> +					return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +				xss = (ghcb->save.rdx << 32) | ghcb->save.rax;
>> +
>> +				/* Invalidate qwords for likely another following GHCB call */
>> +				vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
> 
> Ok, so I agree with this fix, but could you please reduce the ugliness
> of this open-coded RDMSR by factoring out this sequence into a new
> helper, called rdmsr_GHCB() or so, with a similar signature as
> rdmsr(), where rdmsr_GHCB() emulates RDMSR behavior via a hypercall?
> 
> That makes this workaround to reduce nesting a lot easier to read & maintain
> in the longer run.

Currently it is:

#define rdmsr(msr, low, high)

Will the below signature do?

#define rdmsr_GHCB(msr, low, high, ghcb, ctxt) {( \
	int __ret; \
	ghcb_set_rcx((ghcb), (msr)); \
	__ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call((ghcb), (ctxt), SVM_EXIT_MSR, 0, 0); \
	if (__ret = ES_OK) { \
		low = (ghcb)->save.rax; \
		high = (ghcb)->save.rdx; \
	} \
	__ret; )}


rdmsr() does not return a value but rdmsr_GHCB() has to, can even make 
it static inline function, should I?


Thanks,

> 
> Thanks,
> 
> 	Ingo

-- 
Alexey


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