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Message-ID: <20230926-kajak-klarzukommen-e6c6e3662798@brauner>
Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2023 12:05:57 +0200
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-man@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Karel Zak <kzak@...hat.com>,
Ian Kent <raven@...maw.net>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/3] add statmnt(2) syscall
On Mon, Sep 25, 2023 at 05:46:59PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 25, 2023, at 15:20, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > On Mon, 25 Sept 2023 at 15:19, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> > How about passing u64 *?
> >>
> >> struct statmnt_req {
> >> __u64 mnt_id;
> >> __u64 mask;
> >> };
> >>
> >> ?
> >
> > I'm fine with that as well.
>
> Yes, this looks fine for the compat syscall purpose.
>
> Not sure if losing visibility of the mnt_id and mask in ptrace
> or seccomp/bpf is a problem though.
It's an information retrieval syscall so there shouldn't be any need to
block it and I think that this ship has sailed in general. Container
workloads should migrate from seccomp to landlock if they need to filter
system calls like this.
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