linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3] certs: Add option to disallow non-CA certificates in secondary trusted keying

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Message-ID: <4A271804-9481-4454-A371-3A7CA26F40D9@oracle.com>
Date:   Tue, 3 Oct 2023 19:04:09 +0000
From:   Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
CC:     Denis Glazkov <d.glazkov@....ru>,
        "dhowells@...hat.com" <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        "dwmw2@...radead.org" <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@....ru>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] certs: Add option to disallow non-CA certificates in
 secondary trusted keying



> On Oct 2, 2023, at 5:49 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org> wrote:
> 
> On Mon Oct 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM EEST, Denis Glazkov wrote:
>> The Linux kernel has an IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture)
>> subsystem to check the integrity of the file system based on digital
>> signatures. IMA uses certificates in `.ima` keying to check integrity.
>> 
>> Only certificates issued by one of the trusted CA (Certificate Authority)
>> certificates can be added to the `.ima` keying.
>> 
>> The Linux kernel now has a secondary trusted keying to which trusted
>> certificates from user space can be added if you have superuser
>> privileges. Previously, all trusted certificates were in the built-in
>> trusted keying, which could not be modified from user space.
>> Trusted certificates were placed in the built-in trusted keying at
>> kernel compile time.
>> 
>> The secondary trusted keying is designed so that any certificates that
>> are signed by one of the trusted CA certificates in the built-in or
>> secondary trusted keyring can be added to it.
>> 
>> Let's imagine that we have the following certificate trust chain:
>> 
>>             ┌───────────────────────────┬─────────────────────┐
>>             │                           │     ┌───────┐       │
>>             │                           │     │       │       │
>> ┌────────────▼────────┐    ┌─────────────▼─────▼────┐  │ ┌─────┴─────┐
>> │.builtin_trusted_keys│◄───┤.secondary_trusted_keys ├──┘ │   .ima    │
>> ├─────────────────────┤    ├────────────────────────┤    ├───────────┤
>> │     Root CA Cert    │-----► Intermediate CA Cert  │-----► IMA Cert │
>> └─────────────────────┘    └────────────────────────┘    └───────────┘
>> 
>>                Issues                  Restricted by
>>            -------------►             ──────────────►
>> 
>> Since the IMA certificate is signed by a CA certificate from a secondary
>> trusted keying, an attacker with superuser privileges will be able to
>> add the IMA certificate to the secondary trusted keying. That is, the IMA
>> certificate will become trusted.
>> 
>> Since, with `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG` option enabled, modules can only be
>> loaded into kernel space if they are signed with one of the trusted
>> certificates, an attacker could sign untrusted kernel modules with
>> the private key corresponding to the IMA certificate and successfully
>> load the untrusted modules into kernel space.
>> 
>> This patch was created not to solve only the problem of loading
>> untrusted kernel modules, but to make it possible to use a secondary
>> trusted keying only as a part of a chain of trust containing only
>> CA certificates with no digital signature capability. This will
>> help avoid similar problems when new features appear in the linux
>> kernel that are similar to kernel modules in terms of their impact
>> on system security, which will also use trusted certificates for
>> signature verification.
>> 
>> This patch adds the configuration that once enabled, only
>> certificates that meet the following requirements can be added
>> to the secondary trusted keying:
>> 
>> 1. The certificate is a CA (Certificate Authority)
>> 2. The certificate must be used for verifying a CA's signatures
>> 3. The certificate must not be used for digital signatures
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Denis Glazkov <d.glazkov@....ru>
>> ---
>> v1 -> v2:
>> - Rebase the patch from `linux-next` to the main `linux` repo master branch
>> - Make the commit message more detailed
>> - Move the variable declaration to the `if` block
>> - Replace `#ifdef` with `IS_ENABLED` macro
>> 
>> v2 -> v3:
>> - Add the purpose and goal of the patch to the commit message
>> ---
>> certs/Kconfig          |  9 +++++++++
>> certs/system_keyring.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
>> index 1f109b070877..4a4dc8aab892 100644
>> --- a/certs/Kconfig
>> +++ b/certs/Kconfig
>> @@ -90,6 +90,15 @@ config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>> 	  those keys are not blacklisted and are vouched for by a key built
>> 	  into the kernel or already in the secondary trusted keyring.
>> 
>> +config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING_FOR_CA_CERTIFICATES_ONLY
>> +	bool "Allow only CA certificates to be added to the secondary trusted keyring"
>> +	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>> +	help
>> +	  If set, only CA certificates can be added to the secondary trusted keyring.
>> +	  An acceptable CA certificate must include the `keyCertSign` value in
>> +	  the `keyUsage` field. CA certificates that include the `digitalSignature`
>> +	  value in the `keyUsage` field will not be accepted.
>> +
>> config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
>> 	bool "Provide system-wide ring of blacklisted keys"
>> 	depends on KEYS
>> diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
>> index 9de610bf1f4b..ee14447374e7 100644
>> --- a/certs/system_keyring.c
>> +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
>> @@ -99,6 +99,22 @@ int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
>> 		/* Allow the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary */
>> 		return 0;
>> 
>> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING_FOR_CA_CERTIFICATES_ONLY) &&
>> +	    dest_keyring == secondary_trusted_keys) {
>> +		const struct public_key *pub = payload->data[asym_crypto];
>> +
>> +		if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
>> +			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +		if (!pub)
>> +			return -ENOPKG;
>> +		if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_CA, &pub->key_eflags))
>> +			return -EPERM;
>> +		if (!test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN, &pub->key_eflags))
>> +			return -EPERM;
>> +		if (test_bit(KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG, &pub->key_eflags))
>> +			return -EPERM;
>> +	}
>> +
>> 	return restrict_link_by_signature(dest_keyring, type, payload,
>> 					  secondary_trusted_keys);
>> }
>> -- 
>> 2.34.1
> 
> I don't think this does any harm.

Right or wrong, there do seem to be Intermediate CA’s that have the 
digital signature usage set [1].

1. https://www.digicert.com/kb/digicert-root-certificates.htm#intermediates

> What do you think Mimi?