lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <D99589F4-BC5D-430B-87B2-72C20370CF57@exactcode.com>
Date:   Wed, 4 Oct 2023 17:29:32 +0200
From:   René Rebe <rene@...ctcode.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Boris Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Subject: [RFC] AMD Zen4 CPU bug? Spurious SMT Sibling Invalid Opcode
 Speculation

Hello everyone,

during cross compiling our “Embedded” Linux Distribution T2 (https://t2sde.org) I observers some random illegal instruction build errors since we got ourselves a Ryzen 7950x on launch day a year ago:

vendor_id : AuthenticAMD
cpu family : 25
model : 97
model name : AMD Ryzen 9 7950X 16-Core Processor
stepping : 2
microcode : 0xa601203

Initially I thought it must surely be some early system instability, and some DDR5 AGESA and microcode updates will eventually take care of that. Month after month passed and so far no BIOS update helped. So I finally started to investigate this over the last months, run the DDR5 memory at base clock, then disabled Precision Boost, and at the end run the CPU and RAM even below advertised base clock and the pseudo random illegal instructions at some gcc instances where still observed and I started to realized they where actually 99% quite identical around gcc user-space address 0xc0e0c0 (sometimes slightly off like 0xc08aaf):

during GIMPLE pass: switchlower
../src/intel/vulkan/anv_nir_lower_ubo_loads.c: In function 'lower_ubo_load_instr':
../src/intel/vulkan/anv_nir_lower_ubo_loads.c:28:1: internal compiler error: Illegal instruction
   28 | lower_ubo_load_instr(nir_builder *b, nir_instr *instr, UNUSED void *_data)
      | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0x1435c95 internal_error(char const*, ...)
        ???:0
0xc0e0c0 tree_switch_conversion::switch_decision_tree::try_switch_expansion(vec<tree_switch_conversion::cluster*, va_heap, vl_ptr>&)
        ???:0
0xc0eb69 tree_switch_conversion::switch_decision_tree::analyze_switch_statement()
        ???:0

   0x0000000000c0e0b6 <+246>:   cmp    $0xffffffff,%r14d
   0x0000000000c0e0ba <+250>:   je     0xc0e190 <_ZN22tree_switch_conversion20switch_decision_tree20try_switch_expansionER3vecIPNS_7clusterE7va_heap6vl_ptrE+464>
   0x0000000000c0e0c0 <+256>:   mov    %rax,%rcx # <----- HERE -----!
   0x0000000000c0e0c3 <+259>:   cmpb   $0x0,0xa8(%r13)
   0x0000000000c0e0cb <+267>:   jne    0xc0e060 <_ZN22tree_switch_conversion20switch_decision_tree20try_switch_expansionER3vecIPNS_7clusterE7va_heap6vl_ptrE+160>
   0x0000000000c0e0cd <+269>:   mov    0xa0(%r13),%rsi
   0x0000000000c0e0d4 <+276>:   mov    $0x8,%eax

The illegal instructions only occur sometimes, so rebuilding a package is usually successful.
To rule out any software inherited instability, I booted the bit identical system copy (using rsync) on a Ryzen 5950x and could build all the system using the identical kernel and gcc binaries without any such spurious illegal instructions.

This appeared to mostly show up with gcc as cross compiled for sparc64, but that should not matter, as this ist just generic x86-64(-v1) code that in similar sequence, memory access and I/O pattern could likely appear in any other sophisticated and complex enough user-space program.

Trying to further narrow this down, and wether it is just one defect core, I patched the kernel to show the likely CPU. Not sure if this is the most reliable, but that is the patch:

--- linux-6.5/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c.orig      2023-10-02 11:53:47.413623693 +0200
+++ linux-6.5/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c   2023-10-02 11:53:58.580624927 +0200
@@ -294,8 +294,12 @@
 static inline void handle_invalid_op(struct pt_regs regs)
 #endif
 {
+       void __useraddr = error_get_trap_addr(regs);
+       int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+       printk("INVALID OPCODE: %lx likely on CPU %d (core %d, socket %d)\n",
+               cpu, addr, topology_core_id(cpu), topology_physical_package_id(cpu));
        do_error_trap(regs, 0, "invalid opcode", X86_TRAP_UD, SIGILL,
ILL_ILLOPN, error_get_trap_addr(regs));
+                     ILL_ILLOPN, addr);
 }

This showed number over all cores and CCX to be affected:

[ 1901.688448] INVALID OPCODE: c0e0c0 likely on CPU 26 (core 10, socket 0)
[ 1930.529211] INVALID OPCODE: c0e0c0 likely on CPU 21 (core 5, socket 0)
[ 1971.898911] INVALID OPCODE: c0e0c0 likely on CPU 27 (core 11, socket 0)
[ 2006.781557] INVALID OPCODE: c0e0c0 likely on CPU 19 (core 3, socket 0)
[ 2054.672900] INVALID OPCODE: c0e0c0 likely on CPU 30 (core 14, socket 0)
[ 2097.180969] INVALID OPCODE: c0e0c0 likely on CPU 27 (core 11, socket 0)
[ 2140.558150] INVALID OPCODE: c0e0c0 likely on CPU 23 (core 7, socket 0)
[ 2168.601674] INVALID OPCODE: c0e0c0 likely on CPU 15 (core 15, socket 0)
…

I sorted the result # dmesg | grep INVALID| sed 's/.*://' | cut -d ' ' -f 6| sort -n| uniq -c
      4 0
      2 1
      2 2
      2 3
      5 4
      5 5 
      3 7 
      4 8 
      4 9 
      2 10
      4 11
      3 12
      5 13
      5 14
      2 15
      6 16
      8 17
      2 18
      5 19
      5 20
      3 21
      7 22
      5 23
      3 24
      2 25
      2 26
      3 27
      4 28
      4 29
      6 30
      5 31

Already discussing this issue with some other folks and kernel developer it was suggested it could be TLB related, and we realized we were booting with mitigations=off for a little higher all system compilation performance and I can report that without mitigations=off this spurious illegal instructions do not appear. Also disabling SMT makes the problem disappear, too.

So I iterated over all the mitigation options and found spectre_v2_user=off to be enough to make this bug reproducibly appear when loading most cores running this sparc64-t2-linux-gcc.

Now the good news is: running with modern security mitigations enabled hides this what to me looks like a Zen 4 SMT sibling processor state corruption bug or mis-speculation. However, I would argue, non malicious user-more programs should not exhibit spurious illegal instructions with an operating system running in a classic, high performance mode without any special security mitigations in place.

As this is very reproducible with GCC for sparc64 for me, I created an initrd with a pre-processed source file (from Mesa IIRC) setup to boot into a loop running sparc64-t2-linux-gcc on all cores (all grouped in usr/local) for others to test how widespread this issue is:

https://dl.t2sde.org/amd-zen4-smt-c0fefe/

Boot with:
spectre_v2_user=off or mitigations=off

It is even reproducible in qemu/kvm running on a host with this spectre_v2_user=off:
qemu-system-x86_64 --enable-kvm -smp 32 -cpu host -m 4G -kernel vmlinuz-6.5.5-t2 -initrd initrd-6.5.5-t2.gz -nographic -append "console=ttyS0"

To test on your system with chroot:
mkdir bug; cd bug; gunzip ../initrd-6.5.5-t2 | cpio -i
chroot . usr/local/init

With this reduced test case illegal instructions appear within an average of just 5 seconds on my Ryzen 7950x.

To rule out that this is some random linux kernel config and optimization fluke, I built the kernel with clang and gcc, without any change, and also downloaded the latest Intel Clear Linux kernel binary to double checked that it is affected in the same way, and sure it does.

After all this research, to me this looks like an Zen 4 CPU bug, but any other comments, hints, patches welcome!

I realize AMD has never microcode for Epyc server CPUs, if this is already fixed in some newer microcode, it would really be amazing (hint) if AMD would release microcode updates for $999 consumer CPUs in a more timely manner, and not only high end server SKUs via linux-firmware, ...

Thank you so much,

René Rebe

--
ExactCODE GmbH, Lietzenburger Str. 42, DE-10789 Berlin
http://exactcode.com | http://exactscan.com | http://ocrkit.com

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ