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Message-ID: <f38831743d8ad127031171016eb2d962d0fe3210.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 20:07:26 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, brauner@...nel.org,
chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, neilb@...e.de,
kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com, dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
casey@...aufler-ca.com
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 07/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() definition
with LSM infrastructure
On Mon, 2023-09-04 at 15:33 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>
> Change ima_post_read_file() definition, so that it can be registered as
> implementation of the post_read_file hook.
The only change here is making "void *buf" a "char *buf".
thanks,
Mimi
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 6 +++---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 93e3c6cdf1f8..6e4d060ff378 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
> extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> bool contents);
> -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> - enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> +int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> + enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> umode_t mode, unsigned int dev);
> @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> +static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index e9e2a3ad25a1..f8581032e62c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
> * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
> */
> -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> +int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> {
> enum ima_hooks func;
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