linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure

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Message-ID: <ea1de829cec76d7e20efa305df0b0758fc986aac.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Fri, 13 Oct 2023 15:45:10 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
        viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, brauner@...nel.org,
        chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, neilb@...e.de,
        kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
        dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
        serge@...lyn.com, dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
        stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
        casey@...aufler-ca.com
Cc:     linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        selinux@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM
 infrastructure

On Mon, 2023-09-04 at 15:33 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> 
> IMA and EVM are not effectively LSMs, especially due the fact that in the
> past they could not provide a security blob while there is another LSM
> active.
> 
> That changed in the recent years, the LSM stacking feature now makes it
> possible to stack together multiple LSMs, and allows them to provide a
> security blob for most kernel objects. While the LSM stacking feature has
> some limitations being worked out, it is already suitable to make IMA and
> EVM as LSMs.
> 
> In short, while this patch set is big, it does not make any functional
> change to IMA and EVM. IMA and EVM functions are called by the LSM
> infrastructure in the same places as before (except ima_post_path_mknod()),
> rather being hardcoded calls, and the inode metadata pointer is directly
> stored in the inode security blob rather than in a separate rbtree.
> 
> More specifically, patches 1-11 make IMA and EVM functions suitable to
> be registered to the LSM infrastructure, by aligning function parameters.
> 
> Patches 12-20 add new LSM hooks in the same places where IMA and EVM
> functions are called, if there is no LSM hook already.
> 
> Patches 21-24 do the bulk of the work, remove hardcoded calls to IMA, EVM
> and integrity functions, register those functions in the LSM
> infrastructure, and let the latter call them. In addition, they also
> reserve one slot for EVM to supply an xattr with the inode_init_security
> hook.
> 
> Finally, patch 25 removes the rbtree used to bind metadata to the inodes,
> and instead reserves a space in the inode security blob to store the
> pointer to metadata. This also brings performance improvements due to
> retrieving metadata in constant time, as opposed to logarithmic.
> 
> The patch set applies on top of lsm/next, commit 8e4672d6f902 ("lsm:
> constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()")

Thanks, Roberto!   There were just a few suggestions/changes, which
though minor, will result in some patch churn.   Other than that, there
were some suggestions patch description suggestions.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi