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Message-ID: <ZSsRUR7nXpY7lAWM@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Oct 2023 00:08:17 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [GIT PULL] x86 fixes
Linus,
Please pull the latest x86/urgent git tree from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-2023-10-15
# HEAD: d35652a5fc9944784f6f50a5c979518ff8dacf61 x86/alternatives: Disable KASAN in apply_alternatives()
Fix a false-positive KASAN warning, fix an AMD erratum on Zen4 CPUs,
and fix kernel-doc build warnings.
Thanks,
Ingo
------------------>
Borislav Petkov (AMD) (1):
x86/cpu: Fix AMD erratum #1485 on Zen4-based CPUs
Kirill A. Shutemov (1):
x86/alternatives: Disable KASAN in apply_alternatives()
Randy Dunlap (1):
x86/resctrl: Fix kernel-doc warnings
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c | 10 +++++-----
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 1d111350197f..b37abb55e948 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -637,12 +637,17 @@
/* AMD Last Branch Record MSRs */
#define MSR_AMD64_LBR_SELECT 0xc000010e
-/* Fam 17h MSRs */
-#define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9
+/* Zen4 */
+#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG 0xc001102e
+#define MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT 5
+/* Zen 2 */
#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN 0xc00110e3
#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT BIT_ULL(1)
+/* Fam 17h MSRs */
+#define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9
+
/* Fam 16h MSRs */
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 517ee01503be..73be3931e4f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -403,6 +403,17 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
u8 insn_buff[MAX_PATCH_LEN];
DPRINTK(ALT, "alt table %px, -> %px", start, end);
+
+ /*
+ * In the case CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y, KASAN_SHADOW_START is defined using
+ * cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57) and is therefore patched here.
+ * During the process, KASAN becomes confused seeing partial LA57
+ * conversion and triggers a false-positive out-of-bound report.
+ *
+ * Disable KASAN until the patching is complete.
+ */
+ kasan_disable_current();
+
/*
* The scan order should be from start to end. A later scanned
* alternative code can overwrite previously scanned alternative code.
@@ -452,6 +463,8 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
text_poke_early(instr, insn_buff, insn_buff_sz);
}
+
+ kasan_enable_current();
}
static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 03ef962a6992..ece2b5b7b0fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ static const int amd_div0[] =
AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x00, 0x0, 0x2f, 0xf),
AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x50, 0x0, 0x5f, 0xf));
+static const int amd_erratum_1485[] =
+ AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x10, 0x0, 0x1f, 0xf),
+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x60, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf));
+
static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum)
{
int osvw_id = *erratum++;
@@ -1149,6 +1153,10 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 DIV0 bug detected. Disable SMT for full protection.\n");
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_DIV0);
}
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) &&
+ cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1485))
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
index ded1fc7cb7cb..f136ac046851 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
@@ -30,15 +30,15 @@ struct rmid_entry {
struct list_head list;
};
-/**
- * @rmid_free_lru A least recently used list of free RMIDs
+/*
+ * @rmid_free_lru - A least recently used list of free RMIDs
* These RMIDs are guaranteed to have an occupancy less than the
* threshold occupancy
*/
static LIST_HEAD(rmid_free_lru);
-/**
- * @rmid_limbo_count count of currently unused but (potentially)
+/*
+ * @rmid_limbo_count - count of currently unused but (potentially)
* dirty RMIDs.
* This counts RMIDs that no one is currently using but that
* may have a occupancy value > resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold. User can
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static LIST_HEAD(rmid_free_lru);
*/
static unsigned int rmid_limbo_count;
-/**
+/*
* @rmid_entry - The entry in the limbo and free lists.
*/
static struct rmid_entry *rmid_ptrs;
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