Message-ID: <CALmYWFs81T=XnT=AXQTo0+9FXo=OBAV_4rrYPSn9-16O-gBTZg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 17 Oct 2023 16:01:13 -0700
From:   Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
To:     Theo de Raadt <deraadt@...nbsd.org>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        jeffxu@...omium.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        keescook@...omium.org, sroettger@...gle.com, jorgelo@...omium.org,
        groeck@...omium.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        jannh@...gle.com, surenb@...gle.com, alex.sierra@....com,
        apopple@...dia.com, aneesh.kumar@...ux.ibm.com,
        axelrasmussen@...gle.com, ben@...adent.org.uk,
        catalin.marinas@....com, david@...hat.com, dwmw@...zon.co.uk,
        ying.huang@...el.com, hughd@...gle.com, joey.gouly@....com,
        corbet@....net, wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com,
        Liam.Howlett@...cle.com, lstoakes@...il.com, willy@...radead.org,
        mawupeng1@...wei.com, linmiaohe@...wei.com, namit@...are.com,
        peterx@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, ryan.roberts@....com,
        shr@...kernel.io, vbabka@...e.cz, xiujianfeng@...wei.com,
        yu.ma@...el.com, zhangpeng362@...wei.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
        luto@...nel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/8] Introduce mseal() syscall

On Tue, Oct 17, 2023 at 11:20 AM Theo de Raadt <deraadt@...nbsd.org> wrote:
>
> Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 at 02:08, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > It is probably worth noting that I choose to check one and only
> > > one sealing type per syscall. i.e. munmap(2) checks
> > > MM_SEAL_MUNMAP only.
> >
> > Yeah, this is wrong.
> >
> > It's wrong exactly because other system calls will unmap things too.
> >
> > Using mmap() to over-map something will unmap the old one.
> >
> > Same goes for mremap() to move over an existing mapping.
> >
> > So the whole "do things by the name of the system call" is not workable.
> >
> > All that matters is what the system calls *do*, not what their name is.
>
> I agree completely...
>
> mseal() is a clone of mimmutable(2), but with an extremely
> over-complicated API based upon dubious arguments.
>
> I designed mimmutable(2) [1] in OpenBSD, it took about a year to get all
> the components working correctly.  There were many intermediate API
> during development, but in the end the API is simply:
>
>      int mimmutable(void *addr, size_t len);
>
> The kernel code for mimmutable() traverses the specified VA range.  In
> that range, it will find unmapped sub-regions (which are are ignored)
> and mapped sub-regions. For these mapped regions, it does not care what
> the permissions are, it just marks each sub-region as immutable.
>
> Later on, when any VM operation request upon a VA range attempts to
>       (1) change the permissions
>       (2) to re-map on top
>       (3) or dispose of the mapping,
> that operation is refused with errno EPERM.  We don't care where the
> request comes from (ie. what system call).  It is a behaviour of the
> VM system, when asked to act upon a VA sub-range mapping.
>
> Very simple semantics.
>
> The only case where the immutable marker is ignored is during address space
> teardown as a result of process termination.
>
May I ask, for BSD's implementation of immutable(), do you cover
things such as mlock(),
madvice() ? or just the protection bit (WRX) + remap() + unmap().

In other words:
Is BSD's definition of immutable equivalent to
MM_SEAL_MPROTECT|MM_SEAL_MUNMAP|MM_SEAL_MREMAP|MM_SEAL_MMAP, of this patch set ?

I hesitate to introduce the concept of immutable into linux because I don't know
all the scenarios present in linux where VMAs's metadata can be
modified. As Jann's email pointed out,
There could be quite a few things we still need to deal with, to
completely block the possibility,
e.g. malicious code attempting to write to a RO memory or change RW
memory to RWX.

If, as part of immutable, I also block madvice(), mlock(), which also updates
VMA's metadata, so by definition, I could.  What if the user wants the
features in
madvice() and at the same time, also wants their .text protected ?

Also, if linux introduces a new syscall that depends on a new metadata of VMA,
say msecret(), (for discussion purpose), should immutable
automatically support that ?

Without those questions answered, I couldn't choose the route of
immutable() yet.

-Jeff



>
> In his submission of this API, Jeff Xu makes three claims I find dubious;
>
> > Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and this
> > patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
>
> I specifically designed mimmutable(2) with chrome in mind, and the
> chrome binary running on OpenBSD is full of immutable mappings.  All the
> library regions automatically become immutable because ld.so can infer
> it and do the mimmutable calls for the right subregions.
>
> So this chrome work has already been done by OpenBSD, and it is dead
> simple.  During early development I thought mimmutable(2) would be
> called by applications or libraries, but I was dead wrong: 99.9% of
> calls are from ld.so, and no applications need to call it, these are the
> two exceptions:
>
> In OpenBSD, mimmutable() is used in libc malloc() to lock-down some data
> structures at initialization time, so they canoot be attacked to create
> an invariant for use in ROP return-to-libc style methods.
>
> In Chrome, there is a v8_flags variable rounded out to a full page, and
> placed in .data.  Chrome initialized this variable, and wants to mprotect
> PROT_READ, but .data has been made immutable by ld.so.  So we force this
> page into a new ELF section called "openbsd.mutable" which also behaves RW
> like .data.  Where chrome does the mprotect  PROT_READ, it now also performs
> mimmutable() on that page.
>
> > Having a seal type per syscall type helps to add the feature incrementally.
>
> Yet, somehow OpenBSD didn't do it per syscall, and we managed to make our
> entire base operating system and 10,000+ applications automatically receive
> the benefits.  In one year's effort.  The only application which cared about
> it was chrome, described in the previous paragraph.
>
> I think Jeff's idea here is super dangerous.  What will actually happen
> is people will add a few mseal() sub-operations and think the job is done.
> It isn't done.  They need all the mseal() requests, or the mapping are
> not safe.
>
> It is very counterproductive to provide developers a complex API that has
> insecure suboperations.
>
> > Applications also know exactly what is sealed.
>
> Actually applicatins won't know because there is no tooling to inspect this --
> but I will argue further that applications don't need to know.  Immutable
> marking is a system decision, not a program decision.
>
>
> I'll close by asking for a new look at the mimmutable(2) API we settled
> on for OpenBSD.  I think there is nothing wrong with it.  I'm willing to
> help guide glibc / ld.so / musl teams through the problems they may find
> along the way, I know where the skeletons are buried.  Two in
> particular: -znow RELRO already today, and xonly-text in the future.
>
>
> [1] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
>

Powered by blists - more mailing lists