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Message-Id: <20231018074553.41333-1-hu1.chen@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 00:45:53 -0700
From: Chen Hu <hu1.chen@...el.com>
To: miklos@...redi.hu, amir73il@...il.com
Cc: malini.bhandaru@...el.com, tim.c.chen@...el.com,
mikko.ylinen@...el.com, lizhen.you@...el.com,
vinicius.gomes@...el.com, hu1.chen@...el.com,
linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: ovl: ovl_fs::creator_cred::usage scalability issues
*Problem*
ovl_permission() checks the underlying inode with the credential of mounter.
The cred, struct ovl_fs::creator_cred, is somewhat global per overlayfs
superblock. Performance degrades when concurrency increases on the cred, to be
specific, on ovl_fs::creator_cred::usage.
This happens when there are massive file access inside container, especially
on SoC with many cores. With Linux 6.6.0-rc2, we run a web workload container
on Intel 4th Xeon Sapphire Rapids which has 56 cores. Perf reports that 5.7%
(2.50% + 1.87% + 1.33%) CPU stall in overlayfs:
Self Command Shared Object Symbol
2.50% foo [kernel.vmlinux] [k] override_creds
1.87% foo [kernel.vmlinux] [k] revert_creds
1.33% foo [kernel.vmlinux] [k] generic_permission
On Soc with more than 100 cores, we can even observe ~30% CPU stalled!
This scalability issue is caused by two factors:
1) Contention on creator_cred::usage
creator_cred::usage is atomic_t and is inc/dec atomically during every file
access. So HW acquires the corresponding cache line exclusively. This
operataiton is expensive and gets worse when contention is heavy.
Call chain:
ovl_permission()
-> ovl_override_creds()
-> override_creds()
-> get_new_cred()
-> atomic_inc(&cred->usage);
ovl_permission()
-> revert_creds()
-> put_cred()
-> atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage))
2) False sharing
`perf c2c` shows false sharing issue between cred::usage and cred::fsuid.
This is why generic_permission() stalls 1.33% CPU in above perf report.
ovl_permission() updates cred::usage and it also reads cred::fsuid.
Unfortunately, they locate in the same cache line and thus false sharing
occurs. cred::fsuid is read at:
ovl_permission()
-> inode_permission()
-> generic_permission()
-> acl_permission_check()
-> current_fsuid()
*Mitigations we tried*
We tried several mitigations but are not sure if it can be a fix or just
workaround / hack. So we report this and want to have some discussions.
Our mitigations aims to eliminate the contention on creator_cred->usage.
Without contention, the false sharing will be tiny and no need to handle. The
mitigations we tested are:
1) Check underlying inode once in its lifetime.
OR
2) In ovl_permission(), copy global creator_cred to a local variable to
avoid concurrency.
With any mitigations above, CPU will not stall on overlayfs.
Paste mitigation 1 below.
>From 472bd18eaabcde0d41e450f556691151b1bdb64e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chen Hu <hu1.chen@...el.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 15:03:28 +0800
Subject: [RFC PATCH] ovl: check underlying upper inode once in its lifetime
ovl_permission() checks the underlying inode with the credential of
mounter. The cred, struct ovl_fs::creator_cred, is global per overlayfs
superblock. Performance degrades when concurrency increases on the cred,
to be specific, on ovl_fs::creator_cred::usage.
This patch (or hack to some extent) checks underlying upper inode once
in its lifetime, eliminates the cache line contention on
creator_cred::usage and gets 40%+ perf improvement on a 128 cores CPU.
CAUTION:
this may compromise the file permission check. Need to talk with
overlayfs experts.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hu <hu1.chen@...el.com>
---
fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 5 ++++-
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
index 83ef66644c21..62ec99316c7a 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* with creds of mounter
*/
err = generic_permission(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, mask);
- if (err)
+ if (err || ovl_test_flag(OVL_FASTPERM, inode))
return err;
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
@@ -318,6 +318,9 @@ int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
mask |= MAY_READ;
}
err = inode_permission(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realinode, mask);
+ if (err == 0 && upperinode)
+ /* This gets set once for the upper inode lifetime */
+ ovl_set_flag(OVL_FASTPERM, inode);
revert_creds(old_cred);
return err;
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
index 9817b2dcb132..5b71aaa8f77c 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ enum ovl_inode_flag {
OVL_CONST_INO,
OVL_HAS_DIGEST,
OVL_VERIFIED_DIGEST,
+ OVL_FASTPERM,
};
enum ovl_entry_flag {
--
2.34.1
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