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Message-ID: <77423bb774612f0e8eaabfd9501d03389ff2cdbd.1697779681.git.yan@cloudflare.com>
Date:   Thu, 19 Oct 2023 22:32:51 -0700
From:   Yan Zhai <yan@...udflare.com>
To:     netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Aya Levin <ayal@...dia.com>,
        Tariq Toukan <tariqt@...dia.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel-team@...udflare.com, Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
        Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>,
        Alexander H Duyck <alexander.duyck@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 net-next 3/3] ipv6: avoid atomic fragment on GSO packets

When the ipv6 stack output a GSO packet, if its gso_size is larger than
dst MTU, then all segments would be fragmented. However, it is possible
for a GSO packet to have a trailing segment with smaller actual size
than both gso_size as well as the MTU, which leads to an "atomic
fragment". Atomic fragments are considered harmful in RFC-8021. An
Existing report from APNIC also shows that atomic fragments are more
likely to be dropped even it is equivalent to a no-op [1].

Add an extra check in the GSO slow output path. For each segment from
the original over-sized packet, if it fits with the path MTU, then avoid
generating an atomic fragment.

Link: https://www.potaroo.net/presentations/2022-03-01-ipv6-frag.pdf [1]
Fixes: b210de4f8c97 ("net: ipv6: Validate GSO SKB before finish IPv6 processing")
Reported-by: David Wragg <dwragg@...udflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhai <yan@...udflare.com>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index 3270d56b5c37..3d4e8edaa10b 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -162,7 +162,13 @@ ip6_finish_output_gso_slowpath_drop(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
 		int err;
 
 		skb_mark_not_on_list(segs);
-		err = ip6_fragment(net, sk, segs, ip6_finish_output2);
+		/* Last GSO segment can be smaller than gso_size (and MTU).
+		 * Adding a fragment header would produce an "atomic fragment",
+		 * which is considered harmful (RFC-8021). Avoid that.
+		 */
+		err = segs->len > mtu ?
+			ip6_fragment(net, sk, segs, ip6_finish_output2) :
+			ip6_finish_output2(net, sk, segs);
 		if (err && ret == 0)
 			ret = err;
 	}
-- 
2.30.2


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