linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 00/15] x86/boot: Rework PE header generation

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <ZTau5kbdB-9iRfcm@desktop>
Date:   Mon, 23 Oct 2023 19:35:34 +0200
From:   Jan Hendrik Farr <kernel@...rr.cc>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...gle.com>, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Evgeniy Baskov <baskov@...ras.ru>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
        Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/15] x86/boot: Rework PE header generation

On 23 13:22:53, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 3 Oct 2023 at 04:03, Jan Hendrik Farr <kernel@...rr.cc> wrote:
> >
> > On 12 09:00:51, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
> > >
> > > Now that the EFI stub boot flow no longer relies on memory that is
> > > executable and writable at the same time, we can reorganize the PE/COFF
> > > view of the kernel image and expose the decompressor binary's code and
> > > r/o data as a .text section and data/bss as a .data section, using 4k
> > > alignment and limited permissions.
> > >
> > > Doing so is necessary for compatibility with hardening measures that are
> > > being rolled out on x86 PCs built to run Windows (i.e., the majority of
> > > them). The EFI boot environment that the Linux EFI stub executes in is
> > > especially sensitive to safety issues, given that a vulnerability in the
> > > loader of one OS can be abused to attack another.
> >
> > This split is also useful for the work of kexecing the next kernel as an
> > EFI application. With the current EFI stub I have to set the memory both
> > writable and executable which results in W^X warnings with a default
> > config.
> >
> > What made this more confusing was that the flags of the .text section in
> > current EFI stub bzImages are set to
> > IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE | IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ. So if you load that section
> > according to those flags the EFI stub will quickly run into issues.
> >
> > I assume current firmware on x86 machines does not set any restricted
> > permissions on the memory. Can someone enlighten me on their behavior?
> >
> 
> No current x86 firmware does not use restricted permissions at all.
> All memory is mapped with both writable and executable permissions,
> except maybe the stack.
> 
> The x86 Linux kernel has been depending on this behavior too, up until
> recently (fixes are in -rc now for the v6.6 release). Before this, it
> would copy its own executable image around in memory.
> 
> So EFI based kexec will need to support this behavior if it targets
> older x86 kernels, although I am skeptical that this is a useful
> design goal.

I don't see this as an important goal either.

> I have been experimenting with running the EFI stub code in user space
> all the way until ExitBootServices(). The same might work for UKI if
> it is layered cleanly on top of the EFI APIs (rather than poking into
> system registers or page tables under the hood).
> 
> How this would work with signed images etc is TBD but I quite like the
> idea of running everything in user space and having a minimal
> purgatory (or none at all) if we can simply populate the entire
> address space while running unprivileged, and just branch to it in the
> kexec() syscall. I imagine this being something like a userspace
> helper that is signed/trusted itself, and gets invoked by the kernel
> to run EFI images that are trusted and tagged as being executable
> unprivileged.

I've been experimenting with running EFI apps inside kernel space instead.
This is the more natural approach for signed images. Sure, a malicious EFI
app could do arbitrary stuff in kernel mode, but they're signed. On the other
hand running this entirely in user space would at least guarantee that the
system can not crash due to a misbehaving EFI app (at least until
ExitBootServices()).

The question of whether or not to make this the job of a userspace helper that
is signed must have come up when kexec_file_load syscall was added. It would
have also been an option at the time to extend trust to a signed version of
the userspace kexec tool.

Why was kexec_file_load created instead of restricting kexec_load to a signed
version of the kexec userspace tool?