linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/6] x86/entry_64: Add VERW just before userspace transition

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Message-ID: <20231024000038.7zmaydklgf5ahbxq@desk>
Date:   Mon, 23 Oct 2023 17:00:38 -0700
From:   Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, tony.luck@...el.com,
        ak@...ux.intel.com, tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@...ux.intel.com>,
        Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
        antonio.gomez.iglesias@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] x86/entry_64: Add VERW just before userspace
 transition

On Mon, Oct 23, 2023 at 03:45:41PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 10/23/23 15:30, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> >>>>>  	/*
> >>>>>  	 * iretq reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI stack in a
> >>>>>  	 * single instruction.  We are returning to kernel mode, so this
> >>>> This isn't needed here.  This is the NMI return-to-kernel path.
> >>> Yes, the VERW here can be omitted. But probably need to check if an NMI
> >>> occuring between VERW and ring transition will still execute VERW after
> >>> the NMI.
> >> That window does exist, though I'm not sure it's worth worrying about.
> > I am in favor of omitting the VERW here, unless someone objects with a
> > rationale. IMO, precisely timing the NMIs in such a narrow window is
> > impractical.
> 
> I'd bet that given the right PMU event you could make this pretty
> reliable.  But normal users can't do that by default.  That leaves the
> NMI watchdog which (I bet) you can still time, but which is pretty low
> frequency.
> 
> Are there any other NMI sources that a normal user can cause problems with?

Generating recoverable parity check errors using rowhammer? But, thats
probably going too far for very little gain.

> Let's at least leave a marker in here that folks can grep for:
> 
> 	/* Skip CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS since it will rarely help */

Sure.

> and some nice logic in the changelog that they can dig out if need be.
> 
> But, basically it sounds like the logic is:
> 
> 1. It's rare to get an NMI after VERW but before returning to userspace
> 2. There is no known way to make that NMI less rare or target it
> 3. It would take a large number of these precisely-timed NMIs to mount
>    an actual attack.  There's presumably not enough bandwidth.

Thanks for this.

> Anything else?

4. The NMI in question occurs after a VERW, i.e. when user state is
   restored and most interesting data is already scrubbed. Whats left is
   only the data that NMI touches, and that may or may not be
   interesting.