linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 1/6] x86/bugs: Add asm helpers for executing VERW

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Message-ID: <20231024-delay-verw-v2-1-f1881340c807@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 24 Oct 2023 01:08:21 -0700
From:   Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, tony.luck@...el.com,
        ak@...ux.intel.com, tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@...ux.intel.com>,
        Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
        antonio.gomez.iglesias@...ux.intel.com,
        Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
        Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH  v2 1/6] x86/bugs: Add asm helpers for executing VERW

MDS mitigation requires clearing the CPU buffers before returning to
user. This needs to be done late in the exit-to-user path. Current
location of VERW leaves a possibility of kernel data ending up in CPU
buffers for memory accesses done after VERW such as:

  1. Kernel data accessed by an NMI between VERW and return-to-user can
     remain in CPU buffers ( since NMI returning to kernel does not
     execute VERW to clear CPU buffers.
  2. Alyssa reported that after VERW is executed,
     CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y scrubs the stack used by a system
     call. Memory accesses during stack scrubbing can move kernel stack
     contents into CPU buffers.
  3. When caller saved registers are restored after a return from
     function executing VERW, the kernel stack accesses can remain in
     CPU buffers(since they occur after VERW).

To fix this VERW needs to be moved very late in exit-to-user path.

In preparation for moving VERW to entry/exit asm code, create macros
that can be used in asm. Also make them depend on a new feature flag
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.

Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 58cb9495e40f..f21fc0f12737 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -308,10 +308,10 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SMBA		(11*32+21) /* "" Slow Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_BMEC		(11*32+22) /* "" Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK		(11*32+23) /* Shadow stack support for user mode applications */
-
 #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO		(11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS		(11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT	(11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF	(11*32+27) /* "" Clear CPU buffers */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index c55cc243592e..c269ee74682c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -329,6 +329,25 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
+/*
+ * Macro to execute VERW instruction to mitigate transient data sampling
+ * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW
+ * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF.
+ *
+ * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers. To
+ * handle the case when VERW is executed after user registers are restored, use
+ * RIP to point the memory operand to a part NOPL instruction that contains
+ * __KERNEL_DS.
+ */
+.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_verw_\@;", "jmp .Ldo_verw_\@", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
+		/* nopl __KERNEL_DS(%rax) */
+		.byte 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00;
+.Lverw_arg_\@:	.word __KERNEL_DS;
+.Ldo_verw_\@:	verw _ASM_RIP(.Lverw_arg_\@);
+.Lskip_verw_\@:
+.endm
+
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\

-- 
2.34.1