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Date:   Tue, 24 Oct 2023 11:49:01 +0200
From:   Maxime Coquelin <>
To:     Casey Schaufler <>,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/4] vduse: Add LSM hooks to check Virtio device type

On 10/23/23 17:13, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 10/23/2023 12:28 AM, Maxime Coquelin wrote:
>> On 10/21/23 00:20, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> On 10/20/2023 8:58 AM, Maxime Coquelin wrote:
>>>> This patch introduces LSM hooks for devices creation,
>>>> destruction and opening operations, checking the
>>>> application is allowed to perform these operations for
>>>> the Virtio device type.
>>> Why do you think that there needs to be a special LSM check for virtio
>>> devices? What can't existing device attributes be used?
>> Michael asked for a way for SELinux to allow/prevent the creation of
>> some types of devices [0].
>> A device is created using ioctl() on VDUSE control chardev. Its type is
>> specified via a field in the structure passed in argument.
>> I didn't see other way than adding dedicated LSM hooks to achieve this,
>> but it is possible that their is a better way to do it?
> At the very least the hook should be made more general, and I'd have to
> see a proposal before commenting on that. security_dev_destroy(dev) might
> be a better approach. If there's reason to control destruction of vduse
> devices it's reasonable to assume that there are other devices with the
> same or similar properties.

VDUSE is different from other devices as the device is actually
implemented by the user-space application, so this is very specific in
my opinion.

> Since SELinux is your target use case, can you explain why you can't
> create SELinux policy to enforce the restrictions you're after? I believe
> (but can be proven wrong, of course) that SELinux has mechanism for dealing
> with controls on ioctls.

I am not aware of such mechanism to deal with ioctl(), if you have a 
pointer that would be welcome.


>> Thanks,
>> Maxime
>> [0]:

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