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Message-ID: <ed4e9e491c381ea201c1ac37501c6582fba6334d.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2023 08:48:42 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Denis Glazkov <d.glazkov@....ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] certs: Only allow certs signed by keys on the
builtin keyring
On Tue, 2023-10-24 at 02:28 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue Oct 17, 2023 at 3:25 PM EEST, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Originally the secondary trusted keyring provided a keyring to which extra
> > keys may be added, provided those keys were not blacklisted and were
> > vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already in the secondary
> > trusted keyring.
> >
> > On systems with the machine keyring configured, additional keys may also
> > be vouched for by a key on the machine keyring.
> >
> > Prevent loading additional certificates directly onto the secondary
> > keyring, vouched for by keys on the machine keyring, yet allow these
> > certificates to be loaded onto other trusted keyrings.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > certs/Kconfig | 16 +++++++++++++++-
> > crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 4 ++++
> > 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
> > index 4a4dc8aab892..2e621963d260 100644
> > --- a/certs/Kconfig
> > +++ b/certs/Kconfig
> > @@ -88,7 +88,21 @@ config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > help
> > If set, provide a keyring to which extra keys may be added, provided
> > those keys are not blacklisted and are vouched for by a key built
> > - into the kernel or already in the secondary trusted keyring.
> > + into the kernel, machine keyring (if configured), or already in the
> > + secondary trusted keyring.
> > +
> > +config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN
> > + bool "Only allow additional certs signed by keys on the builtin trusted keyring"
> > + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> > + help
> > + If set, only certificates signed by keys on the builtin trusted
> > + keyring may be loaded onto the secondary trusted keyring.
> > +
> > + Note: The machine keyring, if configured, will be linked to the
> > + secondary keyring. When enabling this option, it is recommended
> > + to also configure INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX to prevent
> > + linking code signing keys with imputed trust to the secondary
> > + trusted keyring.
> >
> > config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING_FOR_CA_CERTIFICATES_ONLY
> > bool "Allow only CA certificates to be added to the secondary trusted keyring"
> > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > index 6b69ea40da23..afcd4d101ac5 100644
> > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
> > @@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
> >
> > if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
> > ret = -ENOKEY;
> > + else if (IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN) &&
> > + !strcmp(dest_keyring->description, ".secondary_trusted_keys") &&
> > + !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
> > + ret = -ENOKEY;
> > else
> > ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
> > key_put(key);
>
> Plese pick this to your tree.
>
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Thanks, Jarkko. Applied.
--
thanks,
Mimi
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