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Message-ID: <20231026160100.195099-4-brgerst@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2023 12:00:52 -0400
From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@...il.com>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 03/11] x86/boot: Disable stack protector for early boot code
On 64-bit, this will prevent crashes when the canary access is changed
from %gs:40 to %gs:__stack_chk_guard(%rip). RIP-relative addresses from
the identity-mapped early boot code will target the wrong address with
zero-based percpu. KASLR could then shift that address to an unmapped
page causing a crash on boot.
This early boot code runs well before userspace is active and does not
need stack protector enabled.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 0000325ab98f..aff619054e17 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ KMSAN_SANITIZE_nmi.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_head$(BITS).o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_sev.o := n
+CFLAGS_head32.o := -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_head64.o := -fno-stack-protector
CFLAGS_irq.o := -I $(srctree)/$(src)/../include/asm/trace
obj-y += head_$(BITS).o
--
2.41.0
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