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Message-ID: <376db5ae-1bb0-4682-b132-b9852be3c7aa@gmail.com>
Date:   Sat, 28 Oct 2023 21:21:03 +0200
From:   Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>
To:     Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     nic_swsd@...ltek.com, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] r8169: Coalesce RTL8411b PHY power-down recovery
 programming instructions to reduce spinlock stalls

On 28.10.2023 13:05, Mirsad Goran Todorovac wrote:
> On RTL8411b the RX unit gets confused if the PHY is powered-down.
> This was reported in [0] and confirmed by Realtek. Realtek provided
> a sequence to fix the RX unit after PHY wakeup.
> 
> A series of about 130 r8168_mac_ocp_write() calls is performed to
> program the RTL registers for recovery.
> 
> r8168_mac_ocp_write() expands to this code:
> 
>         static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data)
>         {
>                 if (rtl_ocp_reg_failure(reg))
>                         return;
> 
>                 RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (reg << 15) | data);
>         }
> 
>         static void r8168_mac_ocp_write(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u32 data)
>         {
>                 unsigned long flags;
> 
>                 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>                 __r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, reg, data);
>                 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>         }
> 
> Register programming is done through RTL_W32() macro which expands into
> 
>         #define RTL_W32(tp, reg, val32) writel((val32), tp->mmio_addr + (reg))
> 
> which is further (on Alpha):
> 
>         extern inline void writel(u32 b, volatile void __iomem *addr)
>         {
>                 mb();
>                 __raw_writel(b, addr);
>         }
> 
> or on i386/x86_64:
> 
>     #define build_mmio_write(name, size, type, reg, barrier) \
>     static inline void name(type val, volatile void __iomem *addr) \
>     { asm volatile("mov" size " %0,%1": :reg (val), \
>     "m" (*(volatile type __force *)addr) barrier); }
> 
>     build_mmio_write(writel, "l", unsigned int, "r", :"memory")
> 
> This obviously involves iat least a compiler barrier.
> 
> mb() expands into something like this i.e. on x86_64:
> 
>         #define mb()    asm volatile("lock; addl $0,0(%%esp)" ::: "memory")
> 
> This means a whole lot of memory bus barriers: for spin_lock_irqsave(),
> memory barrier, writel(), and spin_unlock_irqrestore().
> 
> With about 130 of these sequential calls to r8168_mac_ocp_write() this looks like
> a LOCK storm that will thunder all of the cores and CPUs on the same memory controller
> for certain time that locked memory read-modify-write cyclo or I/O takes to finish.
> 
> In a sequential case of RTL register programming, the writes to RTL registers
> can be coalesced under a same raw spinlock. This can dramatically decrease the
> number of bus stalls in a multicore or multi-CPU system:
> 
>         static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>                                               const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
>         {
>                 struct recover_8411b_info const *p = array;
> 
>                 while (p->reg) {
>                         if (!rtl_ocp_reg_failure(p->reg))
>                                 RTL_W32(tp, OCPDR, OCPAR_FLAG | (p->reg << 15) | p->data);
>                         p++;
>                 }
>         }
> 
>         static void r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
>                                             const struct recover_8411b_info *array)
>         {
>                 unsigned long flags;
> 
>                 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>                 __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, array);
>                 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>         }
> 
>         static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
>         {
> 
>                 ...
> 
>                 /* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit
>                  * getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down.
>                  */
> 
>                 static const struct recover_8411b_info init_zero_seq[] = {
>                         { 0xFC28, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2A, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0000 },
> 			...
>                 };
> 
>                 static const struct recover_8411b_info recover_seq[] = {
>                         { 0xF800, 0xE008 }, { 0xF802, 0xE00A }, { 0xF804, 0xE00C }, { 0xF806, 0xE00E },
> 			...
>                 };
> 
>                 static const struct recover_8411b_info final_seq[] = {
>                         { 0xFC2A, 0x0743 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0801 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9 }, { 0xFC30, 0x02FD },
> 			...
>                 };
> 
>                 r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, init_zero_seq);
>                 mdelay(3);
>                 r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x0000);
>                 r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, recover_seq);
>                 r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x8000);
>                 r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, final_seq);
>         }
> 
> The hex data is preserved intact through s/r8168_mac_ocp_write[(]tp,/{ / and s/[)];/ },/
> functions that only changed the function names and the ending of the line, so the actual
> hex data is unchanged.
> 
> Note that the original reason for the introduction of the commit fe4e8db0392a6
> was to enable recovery of the RX unit on the RTL8411b which was confused by the
> powered-down PHY. This sequence of r8168_mac_ocp_write() calls amplifies the problem

I still have a problem with this statement as you're saying that the original
problem still exists. I don't think that's the case.

> into a series of about 500+ memory bus locks, most waiting for the main memory read,
> modify and write under a LOCK. The memory barrier in RTL_W32 should suffice for
> the programming sequence to reach RTL NIC registers.
> 
> [0] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1692075
> 
> Fixes: fe4e8db0392a6 ("r8169: fix issue with confused RX unit after PHY power-down on RTL8411b")
> Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>
> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> Cc: nic_swsd@...ltek.com
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
> Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231028005153.2180411-1-mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr/
> Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>
> ---
> v3:
>  removed register/mask pair array sentinels, so using ARRAY_SIZE().
>  avoided duplication of RTL_W32() call code as advised by Heiner.
> 
>  drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 198 ++++++++--------------
>  1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 126 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
> index 361b90007148..3b28bec7098b 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
> @@ -939,6 +939,32 @@ static void r8168_mac_ocp_modify(struct rtl8169_private *tp, u32 reg, u16 mask,
>  	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
>  }
>  
> +struct e_info_regmask_pair {
> +	u32	reg;
> +	u32	data;
> +};
> +
> +static void __r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
> +				      const struct e_info_regmask_pair *array, int len)
> +{
> +	struct e_info_regmask_pair const *p;
> +
> +	for (p = array; len--; p++)
> +		__r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, p->reg, p->data);
> +}
> +
> +static void _r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(struct rtl8169_private *tp,
> +				     const struct e_info_regmask_pair *array, int len)
> +{
> +	unsigned long flags;
> +
> +	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
> +	__r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, array, len);
> +	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tp->mac_ocp_lock, flags);
> +}
> +
> +#define r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, a) _r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, a, ARRAY_SIZE(a))
> +
>  /* Work around a hw issue with RTL8168g PHY, the quirk disables
>   * PHY MCU interrupts before PHY power-down.
>   */
> @@ -3107,138 +3133,58 @@ static void rtl_hw_start_8411_2(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
>  	/* The following Realtek-provided magic fixes an issue with the RX unit
>  	 * getting confused after the PHY having been powered-down.
>  	 */
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC28, 0x0000);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0000);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0000);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0000);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x0000);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0000);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x0000);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x0000);
> +
> +	static const struct e_info_regmask_pair init_zero_seq[] = {
> +		{ 0xFC28, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2A, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0000 },
> +		{ 0xFC30, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC32, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC34, 0x0000 }, { 0xFC36, 0x0000 },
> +	};
> +
Don't mix code and variable declarations. Did you run checkpatch?
I think it would complain here.

> +	static const struct e_info_regmask_pair recover_seq[] = {
> +		{ 0xF800, 0xE008 }, { 0xF802, 0xE00A }, { 0xF804, 0xE00C }, { 0xF806, 0xE00E },
> +		{ 0xF808, 0xE027 }, { 0xF80A, 0xE04F }, { 0xF80C, 0xE05E }, { 0xF80E, 0xE065 },
> +		{ 0xF810, 0xC602 }, { 0xF812, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF814, 0x0000 }, { 0xF816, 0xC502 },
> +		{ 0xF818, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF81A, 0x074C }, { 0xF81C, 0xC302 }, { 0xF81E, 0xBB00 },
> +		{ 0xF820, 0x080A }, { 0xF822, 0x6420 }, { 0xF824, 0x48C2 }, { 0xF826, 0x8C20 },
> +		{ 0xF828, 0xC516 }, { 0xF82A, 0x64A4 }, { 0xF82C, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF82E, 0xF009 },
> +		{ 0xF830, 0x74A2 }, { 0xF832, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF834, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF836, 0xC50E },
> +		{ 0xF838, 0x9CA2 }, { 0xF83A, 0x1C11 }, { 0xF83C, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF83E, 0xE006 },
> +		{ 0xF840, 0x74F8 }, { 0xF842, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF844, 0x8CF8 }, { 0xF846, 0xC404 },
> +		{ 0xF848, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84A, 0xC403 }, { 0xF84C, 0xBC00 }, { 0xF84E, 0x0BF2 },
> +		{ 0xF850, 0x0C0A }, { 0xF852, 0xE434 }, { 0xF854, 0xD3C0 }, { 0xF856, 0x49D9 },
> +		{ 0xF858, 0xF01F }, { 0xF85A, 0xC526 }, { 0xF85C, 0x64A5 }, { 0xF85E, 0x1400 },
> +		{ 0xF860, 0xF007 }, { 0xF862, 0x0C01 }, { 0xF864, 0x8CA5 }, { 0xF866, 0x1C15 },
> +		{ 0xF868, 0xC51B }, { 0xF86A, 0x9CA0 }, { 0xF86C, 0xE013 }, { 0xF86E, 0xC519 },
> +		{ 0xF870, 0x74A0 }, { 0xF872, 0x48C4 }, { 0xF874, 0x8CA0 }, { 0xF876, 0xC516 },
> +		{ 0xF878, 0x74A4 }, { 0xF87A, 0x48C8 }, { 0xF87C, 0x48CA }, { 0xF87E, 0x9CA4 },
> +		{ 0xF880, 0xC512 }, { 0xF882, 0x1B00 }, { 0xF884, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF886, 0x1B1C },
> +		{ 0xF888, 0x483F }, { 0xF88A, 0x9BA2 }, { 0xF88C, 0x1B04 }, { 0xF88E, 0xC508 },
> +		{ 0xF890, 0x9BA0 }, { 0xF892, 0xC505 }, { 0xF894, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF896, 0xC502 },
> +		{ 0xF898, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF89A, 0x0300 }, { 0xF89C, 0x051E }, { 0xF89E, 0xE434 },
> +		{ 0xF8A0, 0xE018 }, { 0xF8A2, 0xE092 }, { 0xF8A4, 0xDE20 }, { 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0 },
> +		{ 0xF8A8, 0xC50F }, { 0xF8AA, 0x76A4 }, { 0xF8AC, 0x49E3 }, { 0xF8AE, 0xF007 },
> +		{ 0xF8B0, 0x49C0 }, { 0xF8B2, 0xF103 }, { 0xF8B4, 0xC607 }, { 0xF8B6, 0xBE00 },
> +		{ 0xF8B8, 0xC606 }, { 0xF8BA, 0xBE00 }, { 0xF8BC, 0xC602 }, { 0xF8BE, 0xBE00 },
> +		{ 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C }, { 0xF8C2, 0x0C28 }, { 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C }, { 0xF8C6, 0xDC00 },
> +		{ 0xF8C8, 0xC707 }, { 0xF8CA, 0x1D00 }, { 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2 }, { 0xF8CE, 0x48C1 },
> +		{ 0xF8D0, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8D2, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8D4, 0x00AA }, { 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0 },
> +		{ 0xF8D8, 0xC502 }, { 0xF8DA, 0xBD00 }, { 0xF8DC, 0x0132 },
> +	};
> +
> +	static const struct e_info_regmask_pair final_seq[] = {
> +		{ 0xFC2A, 0x0743 }, { 0xFC2C, 0x0801 }, { 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9 }, { 0xFC30, 0x02FD },
> +		{ 0xFC32, 0x0C25 }, { 0xFC34, 0x00A9 }, { 0xFC36, 0x012D },
> +	};
> +
> +	r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, init_zero_seq);
>  	mdelay(3);
>  	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x0000);
>  
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF800, 0xE008);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF802, 0xE00A);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF804, 0xE00C);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF806, 0xE00E);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF808, 0xE027);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80A, 0xE04F);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80C, 0xE05E);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF80E, 0xE065);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF810, 0xC602);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF812, 0xBE00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF814, 0x0000);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF816, 0xC502);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF818, 0xBD00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81A, 0x074C);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81C, 0xC302);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF81E, 0xBB00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF820, 0x080A);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF822, 0x6420);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF824, 0x48C2);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF826, 0x8C20);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF828, 0xC516);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82A, 0x64A4);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82C, 0x49C0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF82E, 0xF009);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF830, 0x74A2);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF832, 0x8CA5);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF834, 0x74A0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF836, 0xC50E);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF838, 0x9CA2);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83A, 0x1C11);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83C, 0x9CA0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF83E, 0xE006);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF840, 0x74F8);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF842, 0x48C4);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF844, 0x8CF8);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF846, 0xC404);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF848, 0xBC00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84A, 0xC403);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84C, 0xBC00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF84E, 0x0BF2);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF850, 0x0C0A);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF852, 0xE434);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF854, 0xD3C0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF856, 0x49D9);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF858, 0xF01F);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85A, 0xC526);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85C, 0x64A5);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF85E, 0x1400);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF860, 0xF007);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF862, 0x0C01);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF864, 0x8CA5);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF866, 0x1C15);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF868, 0xC51B);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86A, 0x9CA0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86C, 0xE013);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF86E, 0xC519);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF870, 0x74A0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF872, 0x48C4);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF874, 0x8CA0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF876, 0xC516);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF878, 0x74A4);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87A, 0x48C8);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87C, 0x48CA);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF87E, 0x9CA4);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF880, 0xC512);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF882, 0x1B00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF884, 0x9BA0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF886, 0x1B1C);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF888, 0x483F);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88A, 0x9BA2);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88C, 0x1B04);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF88E, 0xC508);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF890, 0x9BA0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF892, 0xC505);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF894, 0xBD00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF896, 0xC502);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF898, 0xBD00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89A, 0x0300);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89C, 0x051E);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF89E, 0xE434);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A0, 0xE018);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A2, 0xE092);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A4, 0xDE20);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A6, 0xD3C0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8A8, 0xC50F);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AA, 0x76A4);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AC, 0x49E3);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8AE, 0xF007);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B0, 0x49C0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B2, 0xF103);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B4, 0xC607);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B6, 0xBE00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8B8, 0xC606);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BA, 0xBE00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BC, 0xC602);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8BE, 0xBE00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C0, 0x0C4C);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C2, 0x0C28);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C4, 0x0C2C);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C6, 0xDC00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8C8, 0xC707);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CA, 0x1D00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CC, 0x8DE2);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8CE, 0x48C1);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D0, 0xC502);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D2, 0xBD00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D4, 0x00AA);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D6, 0xE0C0);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8D8, 0xC502);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DA, 0xBD00);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xF8DC, 0x0132);
> +	r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, recover_seq);
>  
>  	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC26, 0x8000);
>  
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2A, 0x0743);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2C, 0x0801);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC2E, 0x0BE9);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC30, 0x02FD);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC32, 0x0C25);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC34, 0x00A9);
> -	r8168_mac_ocp_write(tp, 0xFC36, 0x012D);
> +	r8168_mac_ocp_write_seq(tp, final_seq);
> +
>  }
>  
>  static void rtl_hw_start_8168h_1(struct rtl8169_private *tp)

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