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Message-ID: <9bc69994-c98f-48e4-b956-08a8d98a6e6d@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2023 18:34:12 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@...nel.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Anup Patel <anup@...infault.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
"Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, kvm-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@...el.com>,
Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@...gle.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Anish Moorthy <amoorthy@...gle.com>,
David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@...gle.com>,
Maciej Szmigiero <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Wang <wei.w.wang@...el.com>,
Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@...cle.com>,
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...il.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 22/35] KVM: Allow arch code to track number of memslot
address spaces per VM
On 10/27/23 20:22, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Let x86 track the number of address spaces on a per-VM basis so that KVM
> can disallow SMM memslots for confidential VMs. Confidentials VMs are
> fundamentally incompatible with emulating SMM, which as the name suggests
> requires being able to read and write guest memory and register state.
>
> Disallowing SMM will simplify support for guest private memory, as KVM
> will not need to worry about tracking memory attributes for multiple
> address spaces (SMM is the only "non-default" address space across all
> architectures).
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
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