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Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2023 13:15:11 +0100
From: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@...gle.com>
To: Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+6ada951e7c0f7bc8a71e@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, llvm@...ts.linux.dev, mike.kravetz@...cle.com,
muchun.song@...ux.dev, nathan@...nel.org, ndesaulniers@...gle.com,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com, trix@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [mm?] general protection fault in hugetlb_vma_lock_write
On Tue, Oct 31, 2023 at 7:39 PM Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com> wrote:
>
> On Sun, 2023-10-29 at 02:27 -0700, syzbot wrote:
> >
> > commit bf4916922c60f43efaa329744b3eef539aa6a2b2
> > Author: Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>
> > Date: Fri Oct 6 03:59:07 2023 +0000
> >
> > hugetlbfs: extend hugetlb_vma_lock to private VMAs
> >
>
> I've been trying to reproduce the issue here, but the test
> case has been running for 4+ hours now on a KVM guest, with
> KASAN and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING enabled. No crashes yet.
FWIW you may also try to use the syzbot-built kernel shared via the
"Downloadable assets" section[1]. I've just run the C repro against it
and it crashed immediately.
[ 66.222816][ T5095] general protection fault, probably for
non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000001d: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
[ 66.227224][ T5095] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range
[0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef]
[ 66.230109][ T5095] CPU: 0 PID: 5095 Comm: repro Not tainted
6.6.0-rc7-syzkaller-00142-g888cf78c29e2 #0
[1] Here are the instructions with commands to copy-paste:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/syzbot_assets.md
--
Aleksandr
>
> I'll try adapting the config file from syzkaller so the
> resulting kernel boots here, but this is not looking like
> an easy reproducer so far...
>
> The crash is also confusing me somewhat, because it looks
> like hugetlb_vma_lock_write() is passing a nonsense (very small
> value) resv_map->rw_sema pointer down to down_write, but the
> code has some protection against that:
>
> static inline bool __vma_private_lock(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> {
> return (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)) && vma-
> >vm_private_data;
> }
>
> void hugetlb_vma_lock_write(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> {
> if (__vma_shareable_lock(vma)) {
> struct hugetlb_vma_lock *vma_lock = vma-
> >vm_private_data;
>
> down_write(&vma_lock->rw_sema);
> } else if (__vma_private_lock(vma)) {
> struct resv_map *resv_map = vma_resv_map(vma);
>
> down_write(&resv_map->rw_sema);
> }
> }
>
> At fork time, vma->vm_private_data gets cleared in the child
> process for MAP_PRIVATE hugetlb VMAs.
>
> I do not see anything that would leave behind a tiny, but
> non-zero value in that pointer.
>
> I'll keep poking at this, but I don't know if it will
> reproduce here.
>
> > general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
> > 0xdffffc000000001d: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-
> > 0x00000000000000ef]
> > CPU: 0 PID: 5048 Comm: syz-executor139 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc7-
> > syzkaller-00142-g888cf78c29e2 #0
> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
> > BIOS Google 10/09/2023
> > RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x109/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5004
> > Code: 45 85 c9 0f 84 cc 0e 00 00 44 8b 05 c1 1e 42 0b 45 85 c0 0f 84
> > be 0d 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 <80>
> > 3c 11 00 0f 85 e8 40 00 00 49 81 3a a0 d9 5f 90 0f 84 96 0d 00
> > RSP: 0018:ffffc90003aa7798 EFLAGS: 00010016
> >
> > RAX: ffff88807a0b9dc0 RBX: 1ffff92000754f23 RCX: 000000000000001d
> > RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000000e8
> > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
> > R10: 00000000000000e8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
> > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000)
> > knlGS:0000000000000000
> > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > CR2: 0000000020000280 CR3: 00000000758bf000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
> > Call Trace:
> > <TASK>
> > lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5753 [inline]
> > lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5718
> > down_write+0x93/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1573
> > hugetlb_vma_lock_write mm/hugetlb.c:300 [inline]
> > hugetlb_vma_lock_write+0xae/0x100 mm/hugetlb.c:291
> > __hugetlb_zap_begin+0x1e9/0x2b0 mm/hugetlb.c:5447
> > hugetlb_zap_begin include/linux/hugetlb.h:258 [inline]
> > unmap_vmas+0x2f4/0x470 mm/memory.c:1733
> > exit_mmap+0x1ad/0xa60 mm/mmap.c:3230
> > __mmput+0x12a/0x4d0 kernel/fork.c:1349
> > mmput+0x62/0x70 kernel/fork.c:1371
> > exit_mm kernel/exit.c:567 [inline]
> > do_exit+0x9ad/0x2a20 kernel/exit.c:861
> > __do_sys_exit kernel/exit.c:991 [inline]
> > __se_sys_exit kernel/exit.c:989 [inline]
> > __x64_sys_exit+0x42/0x50 kernel/exit.c:989
> > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
> > do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> > RIP: 0033:0x7ff2b7a78ab9
> > Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7ff2b7a78a8f.
> > RSP: 002b:00007fff926ea6b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
> > 000000000000003c
> > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ff2b7a78ab9
> > RDX: 00007ff2b7ab23f3 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
> > RBP: 000000000000cfda R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000006
> > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff926ea6cc
> > R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
> > </TASK>
> > Modules linked in:
> > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
> > RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x109/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5004
> > Code: 45 85 c9 0f 84 cc 0e 00 00 44 8b 05 c1 1e 42 0b 45 85 c0 0f 84
> > be 0d 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 <80>
> > 3c 11 00 0f 85 e8 40 00 00 49 81 3a a0 d9 5f 90 0f 84 96 0d 00
> > RSP: 0018:ffffc90003aa7798 EFLAGS: 00010016
> > RAX: ffff88807a0b9dc0 RBX: 1ffff92000754f23 RCX: 000000000000001d
> > RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000000e8
> > RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
> > R10: 00000000000000e8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
> > R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000)
> > knlGS:0000000000000000
> > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > CR2: 0000000020000280 CR3: 00000000758bf000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
> > ----------------
> > Code disassembly (best guess):
> > 0: 45 85 c9 test %r9d,%r9d
> > 3: 0f 84 cc 0e 00 00 je 0xed5
> > 9: 44 8b 05 c1 1e 42 0b mov 0xb421ec1(%rip),%r8d #
> > 0xb421ed1
> > 10: 45 85 c0 test %r8d,%r8d
> > 13: 0f 84 be 0d 00 00 je 0xdd7
> > 19: 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rdx
> > 20: fc ff df
> > 23: 4c 89 d1 mov %r10,%rcx
> > 26: 48 c1 e9 03 shr $0x3,%rcx
> > * 2a: 80 3c 11 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rcx,%rdx,1) <--
> > trapping instruction
> > 2e: 0f 85 e8 40 00 00 jne 0x411c
> > 34: 49 81 3a a0 d9 5f 90 cmpq $0xffffffff905fd9a0,(%r10)
> > 3b: 0f .byte 0xf
> > 3c: 84 .byte 0x84
> > 3d: 96 xchg %eax,%esi
> > 3e: 0d .byte 0xd
> >
> >
> > ---
> > This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> > See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
> > syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@...glegroups.com.
> >
> > syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
> > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
> > For information about bisection process see:
> > https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
> >
> > If the bug is already fixed, let syzbot know by replying with:
> > #syz fix: exact-commit-title
> >
> > If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with:
> > #syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash
> > If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before
> > testing.
> >
> > If you want to overwrite bug's subsystems, reply with:
> > #syz set subsystems: new-subsystem
> > (See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard)
> >
> > If the bug is a duplicate of another bug, reply with:
> > #syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report
> >
> > If you want to undo deduplication, reply with:
> > #syz undup
> >
>
> --
> All Rights Reversed.
>
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