[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <8477b471-2d57-4b16-912c-64002edc4f6d@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 09:25:01 -0800
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, brauner@...nel.org,
chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, neilb@...e.de,
kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
mic@...ikod.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 05/23] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() definition with
LSM infrastructure
On 11/7/2023 5:39 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>
> Change ima_post_read_file() definition, by making "void *buf" a
> "char *buf", so that it can be registered as implementation of the
> post_read_file hook.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index 678a03fddd7e..31ef6c3c3207 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
> extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> bool contents);
> -extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> +extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> struct dentry *dentry);
> @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> +static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index b3f5e8401056..02021ee467d3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
> * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
> */
> -int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> +int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> {
> enum ima_hooks func;
Powered by blists - more mailing lists