linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel

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Message-ID: <c077e005c64aa82c7eaf4252f322c4ca29a2d0af.camel@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue, 07 Nov 2023 20:20:52 +0200
From:   Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     John Allen <john.allen@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com,
        weijiang.yang@...el.com, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com,
        x86@...nel.org, thomas.lendacky@....com, bp@...en8.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for
 hypervisor kernel

On Thu, 2023-11-02 at 16:22 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 02, 2023, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > On Tue, 2023-10-10 at 20:02 +0000, John Allen wrote:
> > > @@ -3032,6 +3037,9 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> > >  		if (guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
> > >  			svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
> > >  	}
> > > +
> > > +	if (kvm_caps.supported_xss)
> > > +		set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_XSS, 1, 1);
> > 
> > This is not just a virtualization hole. This allows the guest to set MSR_IA32_XSS
> > to whatever value it wants, and thus it might allow XSAVES to access some host msrs
> > that guest must not be able to access.
> > 
> > AMD might not yet have such msrs, but on Intel side I do see various components
> > like 'HDC State', 'HWP state' and such.
> 
> The approach AMD has taken with SEV-ES+ is to have ucode context switch everything
> that the guest can access.  So, in theory, if/when AMD adds more XCR0/XSS-based
> features, that state will also be context switched.
> 
> Don't get me wrong, I hate this with a passion, but it's not *quite* fatally unsafe,
> just horrific.
> 
> > I understand that this is needed so that #VC handler could read this msr, and
> > trying to read it will cause another #VC which is probably not allowed (I
> > don't know this detail of SEV-ES)
> > 
> > I guess #VC handler should instead use a kernel cached value of this msr
> > instead, or at least KVM should only allow reads and not writes to it.
> 
> Nope, doesn't work.  In addition to automatically context switching state, SEV-ES
> also encrypts the guest state, i.e. KVM *can't* correctly virtualize XSS (or XCR0)
> for the guest, because KVM *can't* load the guest's desired value into hardware.
> 
> The guest can do #VMGEXIT (a.k.a. VMMCALL) all it wants to request a certain XSS
> or XCR0, and there's not a damn thing KVM can do to service the request.
> 

Ah, I understand now. Everything makes sense, and yes, this is really ugly.

Best regards,
	Maxim Levitsky