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Message-ID: <d89f022f2813a48b7a7751d5b81c391844e94041.camel@infradead.org>
Date: Wed, 08 Nov 2023 21:56:17 +0000
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Paul Durrant <paul@....org>, Jack Allister <jalliste@...zon.co.uk>,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Paul Durrant <pdurrant@...zon.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 11/11] KVM: xen: allow vcpu_info content to be
'safely' copied
On Wed, 2023-11-08 at 12:55 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>
> Any objection to splitting out the vcpu_info chunk to a separate function? That'd
> eliminate the subtle gpc+lock switch, and provide a convenient and noticeable
> location to explain why it's ok for setting the vcpu_info to fail.
No objection, that looks entirely sane to me.
> E.g.
>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/xen.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
> index d65e89e062e4..cd2021ba0ae3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/xen.c
> @@ -1621,6 +1621,57 @@ static void kvm_xen_check_poller(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int port)
> }
> }
>
> +static int kvm_xen_needs_a_name(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int port_word_bit)
>
kvm_xen_deliver_vcpu_evtchn_pending_sel() ?
...
> - out_rcu:
> + out_unlock:
> read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, flags);
> +
> + /* Paul to add comment explaining why it's ok kvm_xen_needs_a_name() fails */
Basically the point here is that it *doesn't* fail. Either it delivers
directly to the vcpu_info at the appropriate GPA via the GPC, or it
will set the corresponding bit in the 'shadow'
vcpu->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel to be delivered later by
kvm_xen_inject_pending_events(). Either way, it's 'success'.
I do want to vet the code path where userspace forgets to reinstate the
vcpu_info before running the vCPU again. Looking at
kvm_xen_inject_pending_events(), I think the kvm_gpc_check() for the
vcpu_info will fail, so it'll just return, and KVM will enter the vCPU
with vcpu->arch.xen.evtchn_pending_sel still unchanged? The bits won't
get delivered until the next time the vCPU is entered after the
vcpu_info is set.
Which I *think* is fine. Userspace has to stop running the vCPU in
order to actually set the vcpu_info again, when it finally decides to
do so. And if it never does, that works out as well as can be
expected.
Probably does want adding to the selftest.
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