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Message-ID: <c1e85d8a-7f59-4c75-ada1-8a80d79c2b4e@amazon.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 13:45:38 +0100
From: Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>
To: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz@...zon.com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org>,
<pbonzini@...hat.com>, <seanjc@...gle.com>, <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
<anelkz@...zon.com>, <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, <jgowans@...zon.com>,
<corbert@....net>, <kys@...rosoft.com>, <haiyangz@...rosoft.com>,
<decui@...rosoft.com>, <x86@...nel.org>,
<linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 30/33] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Introduce
KVM_REQ_HV_INJECT_INTERCEPT request
On 08.11.23 12:18, Nicolas Saenz Julienne wrote:
> Introduce a new request type, KVM_REQ_HV_INJECT_INTERCEPT which allows
> injecting out-of-band Hyper-V secure intercepts. For now only memory
> access intercepts are supported. These are triggered when access a GPA
> protected by a higher VTL. The memory intercept metadata is filled based
> on the GPA provided through struct kvm_vcpu_hv_intercept_info, and
> injected into the guest through SynIC message.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz@...zon.com>
IMHO memory protection violations should result in a user space exit.
User space can then validate what to do with the violation and if
necessary inject an intercept.
That means from an API point of view, you want a new exit reason
(violation) and an ioctl that allows you to transmit the violating CPU
state into the target vCPU. I don't think the injection should even know
that the source of data for the violation was a vCPU.
Alex
Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
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