linux-kernel - [PATCH v1 07/23] KVM: VMX: Disable intercepting FRED MSRs

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Message-ID: <20231108183003.5981-8-xin3.li@intel.com>
Date:   Wed,  8 Nov 2023 10:29:47 -0800
From:   Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     seanjc@...gle.com, pbonzini@...hat.com, corbet@....net,
        kys@...rosoft.com, haiyangz@...rosoft.com, wei.liu@...nel.org,
        decui@...rosoft.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        bp@...en8.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org,
        hpa@...or.com, vkuznets@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org,
        ravi.v.shankar@...el.com
Subject: [PATCH v1 07/23] KVM: VMX: Disable intercepting FRED MSRs

Add FRED MSRs to the valid passthrough MSR list and disable intercepting
FRED MSRs only if FRED is enumerated after set CPUID.

Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 5d4786812664..327e052d90c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -700,6 +700,9 @@ static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
 	case MSR_LBR_CORE_TO ... MSR_LBR_CORE_TO + 8:
 		/* LBR MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() */
 		return true;
+	case MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 ... MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG:
+		/* FRED MSRs should be passthrough to FRED guests only */
+		return true;
 	}
 
 	r = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr) != -ENOENT;
@@ -7813,6 +7816,16 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_config_fred_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	secondary_vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx,
 					  SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |
 					  SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
+
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, MSR_TYPE_RW);
 }
 
 static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-- 
2.42.0