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Message-ID: <20231112114555.095d9a2d@rorschach.local.home>
Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2023 11:45:55 -0500
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: Kairui Song <ryncsn@...il.com>
Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@...cent.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@...wei.com>,
linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tracing: fix UAF caused by memory ordering issue
On Sun, 12 Nov 2023 23:00:30 +0800
Kairui Song <ryncsn@...il.com> wrote:
> From: Kairui Song <kasong@...cent.com>
>
> Following kernel panic was observed when doing ftrace stress test:
>
> Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 9699b0f8ece28240
> Mem abort info:
> ESR = 0x0000000096000004
> EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
> SET = 0, FnV = 0
> EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
> FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
> Data abort info:
> ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
> CM = 0, WnR = 0
> [9699b0f8ece28240] address between user and kernel address ranges
> Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in: rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core rfkill vfat fat loop fuse nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 sr_mod cdrom crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf drm_shmem_helper virtio_blk drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops virtio_console sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm virtio_scsi i2c_core virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_mmio dm_multipath dm_mod autofs4 [last unloaded: ipmi_msghandler]
> CPU: 0 PID: 499719 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.1.61+ #2
> Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
> pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
> pc : __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1dc/0x2e4
> lr : __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2e4
> sp : ffff80000ad23aa0
> x29: ffff80000ad23ab0 x28: 00000004052b8000 x27: ffffc513863b0000
> x26: 0000000000000040 x25: ffffc51384f21ca4 x24: 00000000ffffffff
> x23: d615521430b1b1a5 x22: ffffc51386044770 x21: 0000000000000000
> x20: 0000000000000cc0 x19: ffff0000c0001200 x18: 0000000000000000
> x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000aaaae65e1630
> x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffffc513863e67a0 x12: ffffc513863af6d8
> x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff80000ad23aa0 x9 : ffffc51385058078
> x8 : 0000000000000018 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000010
> x5 : ffff0000c09c2280 x4 : ffffc51384f21ca4 x3 : 0000000000000040
> x2 : 9699b0f8ece28240 x1 : ffff0000c09c2280 x0 : 9699b0f8ece28200
> Call trace:
> __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1dc/0x2e4
> __kmalloc+0x6c/0x1c0
> func_add+0x1a4/0x200
> tracepoint_add_func+0x70/0x230
> tracepoint_probe_register+0x6c/0xb4
> trace_event_reg+0x8c/0xa0
> __ftrace_event_enable_disable+0x17c/0x440
> __ftrace_set_clr_event_nolock+0xe0/0x150
> system_enable_write+0xe0/0x114
> vfs_write+0xd0/0x2dc
> ksys_write+0x78/0x110
> __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
> invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x58/0xf0
> el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x54/0x160
> do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x60
> el0_svc+0x40/0x1ac
> el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x120
> el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0
> Code: b9402a63 f9405e77 8b030002 d5384101 (f8636803)
>
> Panic was caused by corrupted freelist pointer. After more debugging,
So you are saying that the above is caused by the free list corruption
(hence we can ignore the stack trace)
> I found the root cause is UAF of slab allocated object in ftrace
> introduced by commit eecb91b9f98d ("tracing: Fix memleak due to race
> between current_tracer and trace"), and so far it's only reproducible
> on some ARM64 machines, the UAF and free stack is:
>
> UAF:
> kasan_report+0xa8/0x1bc
> __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x28/0x3c
> print_graph_function_flags+0x524/0x5a0
> print_graph_function_event+0x28/0x40
> print_trace_line+0x5c4/0x1030
> s_show+0xf0/0x460
> seq_read_iter+0x930/0xf5c
> seq_read+0x130/0x1d0
> vfs_read+0x288/0x840
> ksys_read+0x130/0x270
> __arm64_sys_read+0x78/0xac
> invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x90/0x224
> do_el0_svc+0x118/0x3dc
> el0_svc+0x54/0x120
> el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x120
> el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0
>
> Freed by:
> kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x5c
> __kasan_slab_free+0xe8/0x154
> slab_free_freelist_hook+0xfc/0x1e0
> __kmem_cache_free+0x138/0x260
> kfree+0xd0/0x1d0
> graph_trace_close+0x60/0x90
> s_start+0x610/0x910
> seq_read_iter+0x274/0xf5c
> seq_read+0x130/0x1d0
> vfs_read+0x288/0x840
> ksys_read+0x130/0x270
> __arm64_sys_read+0x78/0xac
> invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x90/0x224
> do_el0_svc+0x118/0x3dc
> el0_svc+0x54/0x120
> el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x120
> el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0
>
> Despite the s_start and s_show being serialized by seq_file mutex,
> the tracer struct copy in s_start introduced by the commit mentioned
> above is not atomic nor guarenteened to be seen by all CPUs. So
> following seneriao is possible (and actually happened):
What do you mean it is not atomic? The change should be done under a
trace_types_lock, right? Doing something under a mutex is suppose to
protect it.
>
> CPU 1 CPU 2
> seq_read_iter seq_read_iter
> mutex_lock(&m->lock);
> s_start
> // iter->trace is graph_trace
> iter->trace->close(iter);
> graph_trace_close
> kfree(data) <- *** data released here ***
> // copy current_trace to iter->trace
> // but not synced to CPU 2
> *iter->trace = *tr->current_trace
> ... (goes on)
> mutex_unlock(&m->lock);
> mutex_lock(&m->lock);
The above mutex is trace_types_lock. If you are saying that the memory
isn't being flushed, and we need a memory barrier *inside the mutex
critical section* to let it be seen after the mutex is released and
taken again, then I think that looks to be a major failure of the mutex
implementation!
> ... (s_start and other work)
> s_show
> print_trace_line(iter)
> // iter->trace is still
> // old value (graph_trace)
> iter->trace->print_line()
> print_graph_function_flags
> data->cpu_data <- *** data UAF ***
>
> The UAF corrupted the slab freelist and caused panic on another slab
> allocation.
>
> After applying the barrier, the problem is gone.
I think you just changed the race. I'm not sure you actually fixed the
bug.
>
> Fixes: eecb91b9f98d ("tracing: Fix memleak due to race between current_tracer and trace")
> Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@...cent.com>
> ---
> kernel/trace/trace.c | 13 ++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
> index 9aebf904ff97..c377cdf3701b 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
> @@ -4182,11 +4182,14 @@ static void *s_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
> int cpu;
>
> mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
> - if (unlikely(tr->current_trace != iter->trace)) {
> - /* Close iter->trace before switching to the new current tracer */
> - if (iter->trace->close)
> - iter->trace->close(iter);
> - iter->trace = tr->current_trace;
> + if (unlikely(tr->current_trace && iter->trace->name != tr->current_trace->name)) {
Why the name check?
> + /* Switch to the new current tracer then close old tracer */
> + struct tracer *prev_trace = iter->trace;
> + *iter->trace = *tr->current_trace;
> + /* Make sure the switch is seen by all CPUs before closing */
> + smp_wmb();
Why? A smp_wmb() must be paired with a smp_rmb() where is that? And why
isn't the mutex lock protecting this?
-- Steve
> + if (prev_trace->close)
> + prev_trace->close(iter);
> /* Reopen the new current tracer */
> if (iter->trace->open)
> iter->trace->open(iter);
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