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Message-ID: <CAHk-=wj1qDhzGRYnfHb-jYHiT_3x+PuA8Zk9FosCzm5OL6e=GQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2023 10:50:10 -0800
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Jasper Niebuhr <yjnworkstation@...il.com>,
Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exitz syscall
On Sun, 12 Nov 2023 at 07:44, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote:
>
> How about adding a flag MLOCK_ZERO_ON_FREE used by the mlock2() system
> call? The number of pages which an unprivileged process can lock is
> already capped via RLIMIT_MEMLOCK (or else mlock would be it own
> denial of service attack). That way if process dies from crash, the
> keys would be zero'ed.
Yes, that is a lot better as an interface.
However, it still needs to also make sure that the memory in question
is not file-backed etc. Which the patch I saw didn't seem to do
either.
End result: as it was, that exitz patch was not helping security. It
was anything but.
Linus
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