Message-ID: <f9360f2d-ad2d-4f06-bf01-85b2630cd237@oracle.com>
Date:   Thu, 16 Nov 2023 09:55:42 -0800
From:   ross.philipson@...cle.com
To:     Alyssa Ross <hi@...ssa.is>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
        dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com, ardb@...nel.org, mjg59@...f.ucam.org,
        James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com, luto@...capital.net,
        nivedita@...m.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com,
        trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 02/13] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel
 documentation

On 11/12/23 10:07 AM, Alyssa Ross wrote:
>> +Load-time Integrity
>> +-------------------
>> +
>> +It is critical to understand what load-time integrity establishes about a
>> +system and what is assumed, i.e. what is being trusted. Load-time integrity is
>> +when a trusted entity, i.e. an entity with an assumed integrity, takes an
>> +action to assess an entity being loaded into memory before it is used. A
>> +variety of mechanisms may be used to conduct the assessment, each with
>> +different properties. A particular property is whether the mechanism creates an
>> +evidence of the assessment. Often either cryptographic signature checking or
>> +hashing are the common assessment operations used.
>> +
>> +A signature checking assessment functions by requiring a representation of the
>> +accepted authorities and uses those representations to assess if the entity has
>> +been signed by an accepted authority. The benefit to this process is that
>> +assessment process includes an adjudication of the assessment. The drawbacks
>> +are that 1) the adjudication is susceptible to tampering by the Trusted
>> +Computing Base (TCB), 2) there is no evidence to assert that an untampered
>> +adjudication was completed, and 3) the system must be an active participant in
>> +the key management infrastructure.
>> +
>> +A cryptographic hashing assessment does not adjudicate the assessment but
>> +instead, generates evidence of the assessment to be adjudicated independently.
>> +The benefits to this approach is that the assessment may be simple such that it
>> +may be implemented in an immutable mechanism, e.g. in hardware.  Additionally,
>> +it is possible for the adjudication to be conducted where it cannot be tampered
>> +with by the TCB. The drawback is that a compromised environment will be allowed
>> +to execute until an adjudication can be completed.
>> +
>> +Ultimately, load-time integrity provides confidence that the correct entity was
>> +loaded and in the absence of a run-time integrity mechanism assumes, i.e.
>> +trusts, that the entity will never become corrupted.
> 
> I'm somewhat familiar with this area, but not massively (so probably the
> sort of person this documentation is aimed at!), and this was the only
> section of the documentation I had trouble understanding.
> 
> The thing that confused me was that the first time I read this, I was
> thinking that a hashing assessment would be comparing the generated hash
> to a baked-in known good hash, simliar to how e.g. a verity root hash
> might be specified on the kernel command line, baked in to the OS image.
> This made me wonder why it wasn't considered to be adjudicated during
> assessment.  Upon reading it a second time, I now understand that what
> it's actually talking about is generating a hash, but not comparing it
> automatically against anything, and making it available for external
> adjudication somehow.

Yes there is nothing baked into an image in the way we currently use is. 
I take what you call a hashing assessment to be what we would call 
remote attestation where an independent agent assesses the state of the 
measured launch. This is indeed one of the primary use cases. There is 
another use case closer to the baked in one where secrets on the system 
are sealed to the TPM using a known good PCR configuration. Only by 
launching and attaining that known good state can the secrets be unsealed.

> 
> I don't know if the approach I first thought of is used in early boot
> at all, but it might be worth contrasting the cryptographic hashing
> assessment described here with it, because I imagine that I'm not going
> to be the only reader who's more used to thinking about integrity
> slightly later in the boot process where adjudicating based on a static
> hash is common, and who's mind is going to go to that when they read
> about a "cryptographic hashing assessment".
> 
> The rest of the documentation was easy to understand and very helpful to
> understanding system launch integrity.  Thanks!

I am glad it was helpful. We will revisit the section that caused 
confusion and see if we can make it clearer.

Thank you,
Ross

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