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Message-Id: <20231120173318.1132868-20-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
Date:   Mon, 20 Nov 2023 18:33:12 +0100
From:   Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
To:     viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, brauner@...nel.org,
        chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, neilb@...e.de,
        kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
        paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
        zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
        dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
        stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
        casey@...aufler-ca.com, mic@...ikod.net
Cc:     linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        selinux@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 19/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>

Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from
various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a
new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like
'integrity').

Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(),
which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the
respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm(). Conditionally register
ima_post_path_mknod() if CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is enabled, otherwise the
path_post_mknod hook won't be available.

Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA (renamed to
ima_kernel_module_request()), and conditionally register it as
implementation of the kernel_module_request LSM hook (if
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled).

Define the 'ima' LSM, and initialize it with init_ima_lsm(). Consequently,
assign the LSM_ID_IMA ID to IMA in include/uapi/linux/lsm.h.

Still rely on the existing 'integrity' subsystem to be enabled and to
manage integrity metadata.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com>
---
 fs/file_table.c                        |   2 -
 fs/namei.c                             |   6 --
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c                          |   7 --
 fs/open.c                              |   1 -
 include/linux/ima.h                    |  94 ---------------------
 include/linux/integrity.h              |  13 ---
 include/uapi/linux/lsm.h               |   1 +
 security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c |  22 -----
 security/integrity/iint.c              |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h           |   6 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c      | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 security/integrity/integrity.h         |   1 +
 security/keys/key.c                    |   9 +--
 security/security.c                    |  63 +++------------
 14 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 225 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index c72dc75f2bd3..0401ac98281c 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/task_work.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 
@@ -386,7 +385,6 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
 	locks_remove_file(file);
 
 	security_file_release(file);
-	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
 		if (file->f_op->fasync)
 			file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index adb3ab27951a..37cc0988308f 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -3622,8 +3621,6 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
 		error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
 	if (!error)
 		error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode);
-	if (!error)
-		error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
 	if (!error && do_truncate)
 		error = handle_truncate(idmap, file);
 	if (unlikely(error > 0)) {
@@ -3687,7 +3684,6 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 	}
 	security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
-	ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -4036,8 +4032,6 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode,
 		case 0: case S_IFREG:
 			error = vfs_create(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
 					   dentry, mode, true);
-			if (!error)
-				ima_post_path_mknod(idmap, dentry);
 			break;
 		case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK:
 			error = vfs_mknod(idmap, path.dentry->d_inode,
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index b0c3f07a8bba..e491392a1243 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
 #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/jhash.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -883,12 +882,6 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags);
-	if (host_err) {
-		fput(file);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	if (may_flags & NFSD_MAY_64BIT_COOKIE)
 		file->f_mode |= FMODE_64BITHASH;
 	else
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 02dc608d40d8..c8bb9bd5259f 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/falloc.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/dnotify.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 31ef6c3c3207..23ae24b60ecf 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -16,24 +16,6 @@ struct linux_binprm;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
 extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void);
-extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
-extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				    struct inode *inode);
-extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
-extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
-extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
-			     unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
-extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-			      enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
-extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
-			 bool contents);
-extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
-			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
-extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
 extern int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
 extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
@@ -58,68 +40,6 @@ static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
 	return HASH_ALGO__LAST;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-					   struct inode *inode)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-				    unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-				     enum kernel_load_data_id id,
-				     char *description)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
-				bool contents)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
-				     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				       struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
 static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -170,20 +90,6 @@ static inline void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image)
 {}
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
-extern void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
-					  struct key *key,
-					  const void *payload, size_t plen,
-					  unsigned long flags, bool create);
-#else
-static inline void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
-						 struct key *key,
-						 const void *payload,
-						 size_t plen,
-						 unsigned long flags,
-						 bool create) {}
-#endif  /* CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
 extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void);
 extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index 2ea0f2f65ab6..ef0f63ef5ebc 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -42,17 +42,4 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
-
-extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-
-#else
-
-static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */
-
 #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
index f0386880a78e..ee7d034255a9 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx {
 #define LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN		108
 #define LSM_ID_BPF		109
 #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK		110
+#define LSM_ID_IMA		111
 
 /*
  * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 895f4b9ce8c6..4d11c622fabd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -133,25 +133,3 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/**
- * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
- * @kmod_name: kernel module name
- *
- * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
- * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
- * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
- * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
- * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
- * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
- *
- * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
- * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
- * also signed with digsig.
- */
-int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
-	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index d4419a2a1e24..6cbf2aa5540e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -200,13 +200,13 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
 			      0, SLAB_PANIC, iint_init_once);
 	return 0;
 }
+
 DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
 	.name = "integrity",
 	.init = integrity_iintcache_init,
 	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
 };
 
-
 /*
  * integrity_kernel_read - read data from the file
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c29db699c996..c0412100023e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
 static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+				   const void *payload, size_t plen,
+				   unsigned long flags, bool create);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * The default binary_runtime_measurements list format is defined as the
  * platform native format.  The canonical format is defined as little-endian.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 02021ee467d3..af213bece9b8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
  */
-void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -427,8 +427,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 	int ret;
@@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
  *
  * On mprotect change success, return 0.  On failure, return -EACESS.
  */
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
-		      unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
 	struct file *file;
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 
@@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
 static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
 			    size_t buf_size)
@@ -685,8 +684,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
  * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
  * tmpfiles are in policy.
  */
-void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			     struct inode *inode)
+static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	int must_appraise;
@@ -717,8 +717,8 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
  * file data can be written later.
  */
-void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			 struct dentry *dentry)
+static void __maybe_unused
+ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -753,8 +753,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
-		  bool contents)
+static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+			 bool contents)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -803,8 +803,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	u32 secid;
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
  *
  * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
 	bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
 
@@ -891,9 +891,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
  * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
  * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
  */
-int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
-		       enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
-		       char *description)
+static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+			      enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+			      char *description)
 {
 	if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -1122,4 +1122,72 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
 	return error;
 }
 
+/**
+ * ima_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
+ * @kmod_name: kernel module name
+ *
+ * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
+ * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
+ * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
+ * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
+ * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
+ * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
+ *
+ * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
+ * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
+ * also signed with digsig.
+ */
+static int __maybe_unused ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+	if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_post_open, ima_file_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_create_tmpfile, ima_post_create_tmpfile),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, ima_kernel_module_request),
+#endif
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id ima_lsmid = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.id = LSM_ID_IMA,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Since with the LSM_ORDER_LAST there is no guarantee about the ordering
+ * within the .lsm_info.init section, ensure that IMA hooks are before EVM
+ * ones, by letting the 'integrity' LSM call init_ima_lsm() to initialize the
+ * 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs in this sequence.
+ */
+int __init init_ima_lsm(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks), &ima_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(ima) = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.init = init_ima_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+};
+
 late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 9561db7cf6b4..59eaddd84434 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 
 /* iint action cache flags */
 #define IMA_MEASURE		0x00000001
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index f75fe66c2f03..80fc2f203a0c 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -937,8 +936,6 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen, flags,
 					   true);
-	ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
-				      flags, true);
 
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 
@@ -970,13 +967,9 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
 
-	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 		security_key_post_create_or_update(keyring, key, payload, plen,
 						   flags, false);
-		ima_post_key_create_or_update(keyring, key,
-					      payload, plen,
-					      flags, false);
-	}
 
 	goto error_free_prep;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 423d53092604..e18953ee4a97 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
-	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0))
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0))
 
 /*
  * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
@@ -1182,12 +1183,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *
  */
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2883,13 +2879,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, mmap_prot(file, prot),
+			     flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2918,12 +2909,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3232,12 +3218,7 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
  */
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3253,12 +3234,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
 			      bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 
@@ -3278,12 +3254,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
 
@@ -3298,12 +3269,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
  */
 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_load_data(id, contents);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
 
@@ -3325,13 +3291,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_load_data_id id,
 				   char *description)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
-			    description);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
+			     description);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
 
-- 
2.34.1

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