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Message-ID: <20231120104152.13740-8-bp@alien8.de>
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 11:41:46 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 07/13] x86/CPU/AMD: Move Zenbleed check to the Zen2 init function
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>
Prefix it properly so that it is clear which generation it is dealing
with.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 8d90f5f6b0d9..7cbb108afaf4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -70,12 +70,6 @@ static const int amd_erratum_383[] =
static const int amd_erratum_1054[] =
AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0, 0, 0x2f, 0xf));
-static const int amd_zenbleed[] =
- AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x30, 0x0, 0x4f, 0xf),
- AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x60, 0x0, 0x7f, 0xf),
- AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x90, 0x0, 0x91, 0xf),
- AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf));
-
static const int amd_div0[] =
AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x00, 0x0, 0x2f, 0xf),
AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x50, 0x0, 0x5f, 0xf));
@@ -1039,33 +1033,6 @@ static void init_amd_zen(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
-static void init_amd_zen2(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-{
- init_amd_zen_common();
- init_spectral_chicken(c);
- fix_erratum_1386(c);
-}
-
-static void init_amd_zen3(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-{
- init_amd_zen_common();
-
- if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
- /*
- * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
- * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
- * BTC_NO bit.
- */
- if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
- set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO);
- }
-}
-
-static void init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-{
- init_amd_zen_common();
-}
-
static bool cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode(void)
{
u32 good_rev = 0;
@@ -1087,11 +1054,8 @@ static bool cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode(void)
return true;
}
-static void zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+static void zen2_zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- if (!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_zenbleed))
- return;
-
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
return;
@@ -1106,6 +1070,34 @@ static void zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+static void init_amd_zen2(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ init_amd_zen_common();
+ init_spectral_chicken(c);
+ fix_erratum_1386(c);
+ zen2_zenbleed_check(c);
+}
+
+static void init_amd_zen3(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ init_amd_zen_common();
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ /*
+ * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
+ * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
+ * BTC_NO bit.
+ */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO);
+ }
+}
+
+static void init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ init_amd_zen_common();
+}
+
static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 vm_cr;
@@ -1227,8 +1219,6 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
WARN_ON_ONCE(msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS));
- zenbleed_check(c);
-
if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_div0)) {
pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 DIV0 bug detected. Disable SMT for full protection.\n");
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_DIV0);
@@ -1390,7 +1380,7 @@ static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused)
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id());
- zenbleed_check(c);
+ zen2_zenbleed_check(c);
}
void amd_check_microcode(void)
--
2.42.0.rc0.25.ga82fb66fed25
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