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Message-ID: <4a01cd1d-c9c9-4946-add4-1acf6998a24a@alu.unizg.hr>
Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2023 00:37:03 +0100
From: Mirsad Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>
To: Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
Aditya Kali <adityakali@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/1] kernfs: replace deprecated strlcpy() with
strscpy()
Hi Mr. Tejun Heo,
On 11/22/23 22:31, Tejun Heo wrote:
> Hello,
>
> On Wed, Nov 22, 2023 at 10:20:10PM +0100, Mirsad Goran Todorovac wrote:
>> From: Mirsad Todorovac <mirsad.todorovac@....unizg.hr>
>>
>> According to strlcpy() being officially deprecated and the encouragement
>> to remove the remaining occurrences, this came as the intriguing example.
>>
>> In the kernfs_name_locked() the behaviour of truncating the kn->name is
>> preserved, for it only used in the module for printing in the log and
>> declared static. It is only called from pr_cont_kernfs_name() via kernfs_name()
>> and returned result is ignored.
>>
>> It is avoided to go past the allocated page and cause the internal equivalent
>> of SEGFAULT in the unlikely case kn->name is not null-terminated, which I
>> believe was the idea behind replacing strlcpy() with strscpy().
>
> I don't follow this line of thinking. Yeah, if the input arguments are
> wrong, it can malfunction. strscpy() is gonna page fault too if the input
> string crosses into an unmapped page before the destination buffer is
> filled, right? But it'd be a stretch to claim that that's a problem with the
> function. Maybe I'm missing something but I'm having a hard time seeing the
> value in these conversions.
INTRODUCTION
I will try to explain, it is not complicated, but we have to cover all cases
of use of kernfs_name_locked(), kernfs_name() and cgroup_name() which uses it.
We are lucky that there are only a couple of uses throughout kernel
(verified with grep and Bootlin).
But let's start from the beginning.
We have a semantical gap where strlcpy() returned the rather useless
value of strlen(src) on buffer overrun which was tried to be avoided at all
cost, for it can page fault into unmapped region.
When we use that value, we are in trouble when strlen(src) > buflen,
and we return in effect strlen(src). Calculating it is not only useless, but
possibly can cause page fault in the case src is not null-terminated.
(This is not my idea, I've read it on LWN, but I cannot find the reference
right now, I may be able to provide it later.)
It is also inefficient to scan all characters after the "count"
bytes until the end of src just to be able to say that the length overruns
the buffer, when it is obvious after the first character exceeding "count".
But we are happy that no part of kernel uses this value ATM, so
the function kernel_name_locked() could as well be void.
I will try to elaborate this into greater detail, and I tried to do it
in the full but shortest possible.
===
Allegedly, by the article here: [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/659214/
strscpy() now (or since 2015) copies string up to "count" bytes and
truncates it.
And from the source of strscpy():
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/lib/string.c#L122
size_t max = count;
while (max >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {
unsigned long c, data;
c = read_word_at_a_time(src+res);
if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) {
data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants);
data = create_zero_mask(data);
*(unsigned long *)(dest+res) = c & zero_bytemask(data);
return res + find_zero(data);
}
*(unsigned long *)(dest+res) = c;
res += sizeof(unsigned long);
count -= sizeof(unsigned long);
max -= sizeof(unsigned long);
}
while (count) {
char c;
c = src[res];
dest[res] = c;
if (!c)
return res;
res++;
count--;
}
it is visible that strscpy() will not go ahead more than "count" bytes into
a theoretically unterminated string, certainly not more than the sizeof(unsigned long).
This should dramatically decrease chances of hitting a page boundary and page
fault if the string is erroneously or maliciously not null-terminated.
>> kernfs_path_from_node_locked() has "(null)" which certainly cannot overrun,
>> and a carefully calculated len and truncated path elsewhere.
>
> Some of the functions you're modifying were returning the full length of the
> input string before and it isn't clear from the patch or description whether
> the conversion is safe. It'd help if you can elaborate more on why the
> conversions are safe and how you verified them.
Well, it is not so complicated, once you get into the Source:
The only place where the return value is modified is here:
54 static int kernfs_name_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
55 {
56 size_t len;
57
58 if (!kn)
59 return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen);
60
61 len = strscpy(buf, kn->parent ? kn->name : "/", buflen);
62
63 if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) {
64 return buflen - 1;
65 } else
66 return len;
67 }
Just in this mail Linus has declined the possibility of using any variant of
strlen() to establish the length of kn->name:
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wg7pwWiF4eWVTfFYkfAk_5YDHkmkgZ04cgXkNUO_9pR3A@mail.gmail.com/
kernfs_name_locked() is called from this function:
201 int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
202 {
203 unsigned long flags;
204 int ret;
205
206 read_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags);
207 ret = kernfs_name_locked(kn, buf, buflen);
208 read_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags);
209 return ret;
210 }
The return value is passed to the caller. The kernfs_name() is called only here:
247 void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn)
248 {
249 unsigned long flags;
250
251 spin_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags);
252
253 kernfs_name(kn, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf));
254 pr_cont("%s", kernfs_pr_cont_buf);
255
256 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags);
257 }
and the return value is ignored.
Search shows that kernfs is defined and used here:
Defined in 1 files as a prototype:
include/linux/kernfs.h, line 394 (as a prototype)
Defined in 2 files as a function:
fs/kernfs/dir.c, line 194 (as a function)
include/linux/kernfs.h, line 472 (as a function)
Documented in 1 files:
fs/kernfs/dir.c, line 178
Referenced in 2 files:
fs/kernfs/dir.c, line 246
include/linux/cgroup.h, line 596
Let's go through each case:
A search shows that
user@...t:~/linux/kernel/torvalds4 $ grep -n -E 'kernfs_name[(]' --include '*.c' --include '*.h' -r .
./fs/kernfs/dir.c:201:int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
./fs/kernfs/dir.c:247:void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn)
./fs/kernfs/dir.c:253: kernfs_name(kn, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf));
./include/linux/cgroup.h:594: return kernfs_name(cgrp->kn, buf, buflen);
./include/linux/cgroup.h:604: pr_cont_kernfs_name(cgrp->kn);
./include/linux/kernfs.h:395:int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen);
./include/linux/kernfs.h:398:void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn);
./include/linux/kernfs.h:473:static inline int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
./include/linux/kernfs.h:481:static inline void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn) { }
./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/cgroup.h:594: return kernfs_name(cgrp->kn, buf, buflen);
./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/cgroup.h:604: pr_cont_kernfs_name(cgrp->kn);
./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/kernfs.h:395:int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen);
./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/kernfs.h:398:void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn);
./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/kernfs.h:473:static inline int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/kernfs.h:481:static inline void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn) { }
In include/linux/kernfs.h:395: kernfs_name() is defined as:
395 int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen);
In include/linux/kernfs.h:473: kernfs_name() is defined as:
472
473 static inline int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
474 { return -ENOSYS; }
475
elsewhere it is used in include/linux/cgroup.h:594:
592 static inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen)
593 {
594 return kernfs_name(cgrp->kn, buf, buflen);
595 }
Seek cgroup_name() in the Source:
user@...st:~/linux/kernel/torvalds4$ grep -n -E 'cgroup_name[(]' --include '*.c' --include '*.h' -r .
./include/linux/cgroup.h:592:static inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen)
./include/linux/cgroup.h:602:static inline void pr_cont_cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp)
./kernel/cgroup/debug.c:103: cgroup_name(c, name_buf, NAME_MAX + 1);
./kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:4237: pr_cont_cgroup_name(cs->css.cgroup);
./kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:4878: pr_cont_cgroup_name(cgrp);
./mm/page_owner.c:384: cgroup_name(memcg->css.cgroup, name, sizeof(name));
./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:216:static int add_cgroup_name(const char *fpath, const struct stat *sb __maybe_unused,
./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:235:static int check_and_add_cgroup_name(const char *fpath)
./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:245: return add_cgroup_name(fpath, NULL, FTW_D, NULL);
./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:278: ret = check_and_add_cgroup_name(s);
./tools/perf/util/cgroup.c:283: if (check_and_add_cgroup_name("/") < 0)
./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/cgroup.h:592:static inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen)
./debian/linux-headers/usr/src/linux-headers-6.7.0-rc2-rtl-v0.2-nokcsan-00027-g9b71d857b080-dirty/include/linux/cgroup.h:602:static inline void pr_cont_cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp)
user@...t:~/linux/kernel/torvalds4$
Here in the line 103 the return value of cgroup_name() is ignored:
kernel/cgroup/debug.c:
87 static int current_css_set_cg_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
88 {
89 struct cgrp_cset_link *link;
90 struct css_set *cset;
91 char *name_buf;
92
93 name_buf = kmalloc(NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
94 if (!name_buf)
95 return -ENOMEM;
96
97 spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock);
98 rcu_read_lock();
99 cset = task_css_set(current);
100 list_for_each_entry(link, &cset->cgrp_links, cgrp_link) {
101 struct cgroup *c = link->cgrp;
102
103 cgroup_name(c, name_buf, NAME_MAX + 1);
104 seq_printf(seq, "Root %d group %s\n",
105 c->root->hierarchy_id, name_buf);
106 }
107 rcu_read_unlock();
108 spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
109 kfree(name_buf);
110 return 0;
111 }
mm/page_owner.c:384:
cgroup_name(memcg->css.cgroup, name, sizeof(name));
Referenced in 8 files:
kernel/cgroup/debug.c, line 103
mm/page_owner.c, line 384
All the other references of cgroup_name are struct or struct members:
tools/perf/util/cgroup.c
line 211
line 229
line 242
line 245
line 255
line 296
line 339
line 415
tools/tracing/rtla/src/osnoise_hist.c
line 571
line 574
line 866
tools/tracing/rtla/src/osnoise_top.c
line 415
line 418
line 699
tools/tracing/rtla/src/timerlat_hist.c
line 645
line 648
line 986
line 1061
line 1061
tools/tracing/rtla/src/timerlat_top.c
line 479
line 482
line 796
line 880
line 880
tools/tracing/rtla/src/timerlat_u.c
line 66
line 67
And this is the only place where cgroup_name() is invoked.
Second place where the strlcpy() -> strscpy() is replaced is here:
141 static int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to,
142 struct kernfs_node *kn_from,
143 char *buf, size_t buflen)
144 {
145 struct kernfs_node *kn, *common;
146 const char parent_str[] = "/..";
147 size_t depth_from, depth_to, len = 0;
148 int i, j;
149
150 if (!kn_to)
151 return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen);
152
153 if (!kn_from)
154 kn_from = kernfs_root(kn_to)->kn;
155
156 if (kn_from == kn_to)
157 return strscpy(buf, "/", buflen);
158
159 common = kernfs_common_ancestor(kn_from, kn_to);
160 if (WARN_ON(!common))
161 return -EINVAL;
162
163 depth_to = kernfs_depth(common, kn_to);
164 depth_from = kernfs_depth(common, kn_from);
165
166 buf[0] = '\0';
167
168 for (i = 0; i < depth_from; i++)
169 len += strscpy(buf + len, parent_str,
170 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0);
171
172 /* Calculate how many bytes we need for the rest */
173 for (i = depth_to - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
174 for (kn = kn_to, j = 0; j < i; j++)
175 kn = kn->parent;
176 len += strscpy(buf + len, "/",
177 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0);
178 len += strscpy(buf + len, kn->name,
179 len < buflen ? buflen - len : 0);
180 }
181
182 return len;
183 }
This is safe, as in line 151 "(null)" cannot overrun buf of buflen which
is sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf) which is PATH_MAX:
29 static char kernfs_pr_cont_buf[PATH_MAX];
Line 157 cannot possibly overrun buf, and it is equivalent to strlcpy()
in all cases where there is no possibility of overrun.
Lines 169, 176 and 178 carefully check if (len < buflen) and copy buflen - len
or zero bytes.
This is safe, for we see that in case of count == 0 strscpy() just like
strlcpy() turns to a virtual NOP.
Finally here:
856 static struct kernfs_node *kernfs_walk_ns(struct kernfs_node *parent,
857 const unsigned char *path,
858 const void *ns)
859 {
860 size_t len;
861 char *p, *name;
862
863 lockdep_assert_held_read(&kernfs_root(parent)->kernfs_rwsem);
864
865 spin_lock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock);
866
867 len = strscpy(kernfs_pr_cont_buf, path, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf));
868
869 if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) {
870 spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock);
871 return NULL;
872 }
873
874 p = kernfs_pr_cont_buf;
875
876 while ((name = strsep(&p, "/")) && parent) {
877 if (*name == '\0')
878 continue;
879 parent = kernfs_find_ns(parent, name, ns);
880 }
881
882 spin_unlock_irq(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock);
883
884 return parent;
885 }
the previous test was
if (len >= sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf))
which is safely replaced by
if (len == -E2BIG)
For both will happen if and only if the string overruns the buffer.
CONCLUSION
The only place where the src string can overrun the buffer is here:
54 static int kernfs_name_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
55 {
56 size_t len;
57
58 if (!kn)
59 return strscpy(buf, "(null)", buflen);
60
61 len = strscpy(buf, kn->parent ? kn->name : "/", buflen);
62
63 if (unlikely(len == -E2BIG)) {
64 return buflen - 1;
65 } else
66 return len;
67 }
and this function is only called from
201 int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)
202 {
203 unsigned long flags;
204 int ret;
205
206 read_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags);
207 ret = kernfs_name_locked(kn, buf, buflen);
208 read_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_rename_lock, flags);
209 return ret;
210 }
and
592 static inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen)
593 {
594 return kernfs_name(cgrp->kn, buf, buflen);
595 }
Both kernfs_name() and cgroup_name() are only called while ignoring their return
value in:
247 void pr_cont_kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn)
248 {
249 unsigned long flags;
250
251 spin_lock_irqsave(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags);
252
253 → kernfs_name(kn, kernfs_pr_cont_buf, sizeof(kernfs_pr_cont_buf));
254 pr_cont("%s", kernfs_pr_cont_buf);
255
256 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kernfs_pr_cont_lock, flags);
257 }
and
kernel/cgroup/debug.c:
87 static int current_css_set_cg_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
88 {
89 struct cgrp_cset_link *link;
90 struct css_set *cset;
91 char *name_buf;
92
93 name_buf = kmalloc(NAME_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
94 if (!name_buf)
95 return -ENOMEM;
96
97 spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock);
98 rcu_read_lock();
99 cset = task_css_set(current);
100 list_for_each_entry(link, &cset->cgrp_links, cgrp_link) {
101 struct cgroup *c = link->cgrp;
102
103 → cgroup_name(c, name_buf, NAME_MAX + 1);
104 seq_printf(seq, "Root %d group %s\n",
105 c->root->hierarchy_id, name_buf);
106 }
107 rcu_read_unlock();
108 spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
109 kfree(name_buf);
110 return 0;
111 }
This indicates that the change of semanthics from returning unfortunate
59 return strlcpy(buf, kn->parent ? kn->name : "/", buflen);
and in effect unwanted strlen(kn->name) does not affect the rest of kernel.
Which is more luck than expected.
Linus in [3] says [quote]:
The reason to use strscpy() is to *avoid* doing the strlen() on the
source, and limit things to the limited size.
If you need to do the strlen(), then use strlcpy(). It's a broken
interface, but creating this kind of horror wrapper that does the same
thing as strlcpy() is worse than just using the regular version.
So the strscpy() conversion should *only* be done if the caller
doesn't care about the difference in return values (or done *together*
with changing the caller to use the nicer strscpy() return value).
We are in this case lucky because none of the final callers in the stack trace
cares about the return value of kernfs_name_locked(), or the value in other
functions isn't changed at all, because buffer overrun is carefully avoided
by calculations ensuring len < buflen.
I am just running the kernel with this patch applied, but I don't know of the
border case selftests for the kernfs_name() and cgroup_name() overrun.
REFERENCES:
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/659214/
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/lib/string.c#L122
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wg7pwWiF4eWVTfFYkfAk_5YDHkmkgZ04cgXkNUO_9pR3A@mail.gmail.com/
Hope this helps.
Best regards,
Mirsad Todorovac
> Thanks.
>
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