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Message-ID: <20231122021817.ggym3biyfeksiplo@macbook-pro-49.dhcp.thefacebook.com>
Date:   Tue, 21 Nov 2023 18:18:17 -0800
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     paul.walmsley@...ive.com, palmer@...belt.com,
        aou@...s.berkeley.edu, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        bp@...en8.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org,
        hpa@...or.com, davem@...emloft.net, dsahern@...nel.org,
        ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org,
        martin.lau@...ux.dev, song@...nel.org, yonghong.song@...ux.dev,
        john.fastabend@...il.com, kpsingh@...nel.org, sdf@...gle.com,
        haoluo@...gle.com, jolsa@...nel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        samitolvanen@...gle.com, keescook@...omium.org, nathan@...nel.org,
        ndesaulniers@...gle.com, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        llvm@...ts.linux.dev, jpoimboe@...nel.org, joao@...rdrivepizza.com,
        mark.rutland@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/cfi,bpf: Fix BPF JIT call

On Mon, Nov 20, 2023 at 03:46:44PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CFI_CLANG
> +struct bpf_insn;
> +
> +extern unsigned int bpf_func_proto(const void *ctx,
> +				   const struct bpf_insn *insn);

To make it more obvious what is going on could you rename it to
__bpf_prog_runX()
and add a comment that its prototype should match exactly
bpf interpreters created by DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN() macro,
otherwise cfi will explode.

> +
> +__ADDRESSABLE(bpf_func_proto);
> +
> +asm (
> +"	.pushsection	.data..ro_after_init,\"aw\",@progbits	\n"
> +"	.type	cfi_bpf_hash,@object				\n"
> +"	.globl	cfi_bpf_hash					\n"
> +"	.p2align	2, 0x0					\n"
> +"cfi_bpf_hash:							\n"
> +"	.long	__kcfi_typeid_bpf_func_proto			\n"

Took me some time to grok this.
Cannot you use __CFI_TYPE() macro here ?

> +"	.size	cfi_bpf_hash, 4					\n"
> +"	.popsection						\n"
> +);
> +#endif
...
> +static int emit_fineibt(u8 **pprog)
> +{
> +	u8 *prog = *pprog;
> +
> +	EMIT_ENDBR();
> +	EMIT3_off32(0x41, 0x81, 0xea, cfi_bpf_hash);
> +	EMIT2(0x74, 0x07);
> +	EMIT2(0x0f, 0x0b);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT_ENDBR_POISON();

Please add comments what this asm does. No one can read hex.

> +
> +	*pprog = prog;
> +	return 16;

16 means "the caller of this code will jump to endbr_poison", right?

> +}
> +
> +static int emit_kcfi(u8 **pprog)
> +{
> +	u8 *prog = *pprog;
> +	int offset = 5;
> +
> +	EMIT1_off32(0xb8, cfi_bpf_hash);

and here too.

> +#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_PADDING
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	EMIT1(0x90);
> +	offset += 11;
> +#endif
> +	EMIT_ENDBR();
> +
> +	*pprog = prog;
> +	return offset;

5 or 16 would mean "jump to endbr" ?

> +}
> +
> +static int emit_cfi(u8 **pprog)
> +{
> +	u8 *prog = *pprog;
> +	int offset = 0;
> +
> +	switch (cfi_mode) {
> +	case CFI_FINEIBT:
> +		offset = emit_fineibt(&prog);
> +		break;
> +
> +	case CFI_KCFI:
> +		offset = emit_kcfi(&prog);
> +		break;
> +
> +	default:
> +		EMIT_ENDBR();
> +		break;
> +	}
> +
> +	*pprog = prog;
> +	return offset;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Emit x86-64 prologue code for BPF program.
>   * bpf_tail_call helper will skip the first X86_TAIL_CALL_OFFSET bytes
>   * while jumping to another program
>   */
> -static void emit_prologue(u8 **pprog, u32 stack_depth, bool ebpf_from_cbpf,
> -			  bool tail_call_reachable, bool is_subprog,
> -			  bool is_exception_cb)
> +static int emit_prologue(u8 **pprog, u32 stack_depth, bool ebpf_from_cbpf,
> +			 bool tail_call_reachable, bool is_subprog,
> +			 bool is_exception_cb)
>  {
>  	u8 *prog = *pprog;
> +	int offset;
>  
> +	offset = emit_cfi(&prog);

I'm not sure doing cfi_bpf_hash check in JITed code is completely solving the problem.
>From bpf_dispatcher_*_func() calling into JITed will work,
but this emit_prologue() is doing the same job for all bpf progs.
Some bpf progs call each other directly and indirectly.
bpf_dispatcher_*_func() -> JITed_BPF_A -> JITed_BPF_B.
A into B can be a direct call (which cfi doesn't care about) and
indirect via emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect()->emit_indirect_jump().
Should we care about fineibt/kcfi there too?

>  	/* BPF trampoline can be made to work without these nops,
>  	 * but let's waste 5 bytes for now and optimize later
>  	 */
> -	EMIT_ENDBR();
>  	memcpy(prog, x86_nops[5], X86_PATCH_SIZE);
>  	prog += X86_PATCH_SIZE;
>  	if (!ebpf_from_cbpf) {
> @@ -357,6 +426,8 @@ static void emit_prologue(u8 **pprog, u3
>  	if (tail_call_reachable)
>  		EMIT1(0x50);         /* push rax */
>  	*pprog = prog;
> +
> +	return offset;
>  }
>  
>  static int emit_patch(u8 **pprog, void *func, void *ip, u8 opcode)
> @@ -1083,8 +1154,8 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_p
>  	bool tail_call_seen = false;
>  	bool seen_exit = false;
>  	u8 temp[BPF_MAX_INSN_SIZE + BPF_INSN_SAFETY];
> -	int i, excnt = 0;
>  	int ilen, proglen = 0;
> +	int i, excnt = 0;
>  	u8 *prog = temp;
>  	int err;
>  
> @@ -1094,9 +1165,12 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_p
>  	/* tail call's presence in current prog implies it is reachable */
>  	tail_call_reachable |= tail_call_seen;
>  
> -	emit_prologue(&prog, bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth,
> -		      bpf_prog_was_classic(bpf_prog), tail_call_reachable,
> -		      bpf_is_subprog(bpf_prog), bpf_prog->aux->exception_cb);
> +	ctx->prog_offset = emit_prologue(&prog, bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth,
> +					 bpf_prog_was_classic(bpf_prog),
> +					 tail_call_reachable,
> +					 bpf_is_subprog(bpf_prog),
> +					 bpf_prog->aux->exception_cb);
> +
>  	/* Exception callback will clobber callee regs for its own use, and
>  	 * restore the original callee regs from main prog's stack frame.
>  	 */
> @@ -2935,9 +3009,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(str
>  			jit_data->header = header;
>  			jit_data->rw_header = rw_header;
>  		}
> -		prog->bpf_func = (void *)image;
> +		prog->bpf_func = (void *)image + ctx.prog_offset;

I don't understand this.
prog->bpf_func is the main entry point. Everything jumps there.
Are you trying to skip all of cfi code in the prologue and let
xdp_dispatcher jump to endbr or endbr_poison (depending on fineibt vs kcfi) ?
Then what is the point of earlier asm bits?
Is it a some clang thing that knows to offset indirect jump by
exactly that many hard coded bytes ?
Something in the clang does ptr -= 16 in case of fineibt and just
jumps there ? and ptr -= 5 for kcfi ?

If so, please add a giant comment explaining that.
No one should be reverse engineering such intricate details.

>  		prog->jited = 1;
> -		prog->jited_len = proglen;
> +		prog->jited_len = proglen - ctx.prog_offset; // XXX?

jited_len is used later to cover the whole generated code.
See bpf_prog_ksym_set_addr():
        prog->aux->ksym.start = (unsigned long) prog->bpf_func;
        prog->aux->ksym.end   = prog->aux->ksym.start + prog->jited_len;
we definitely want ksym [start, end] to cover every useful byte
of JITed code in case IRQ happens on that byte.
Without covering cfi prologue the stack dump will be wrong for that frame.
I guess if xdp_dispatcher with fineibt=on jumps into prog->bpf_func - 16
and IRQ fires we don't care that much about accurate stack of last frame ?
I guess it's acceptable, but a comment is necessary.

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