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Message-ID: <18f95549-8971-4b03-8569-61d9b1763364@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 10:55:48 +0800
From: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
CC: <seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
<dave.hansen@...el.com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <chao.gao@...el.com>,
<rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
<john.allen@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit
enabling
On 11/24/2023 5:40 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 24, 2023 at 12:53:06AM -0500, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>> Remove XFEATURE_CET_USER entry from dependency array as the entry doesn't
>> reflect true dependency between CET features and the user xstate bit.
>> Enable the bit in fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features when either SHSTK or IBT is
>> available.
>>
>> Both user mode shadow stack and indirect branch tracking features depend
>> on XFEATURE_CET_USER bit in XSS to automatically save/restore user mode
>> xstate registers, i.e., IA32_U_CET and IA32_PL3_SSP whenever necessary.
>>
>> Note, the issue, i.e., CPUID only enumerates IBT but no SHSTK is resulted
>> from CET KVM series which synthesizes guest CPUIDs based on userspace
>> settings,in real world the case is rare. In other words, the exitings
>> dependency check is correct when only user mode SHSTK is available.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
>> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 9 ++++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
>> index 73f6bc00d178..6e50a4251e2b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
>> @@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ static unsigned short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
>> [XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR] = X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
>> [XFEATURE_PKRU] = X86_FEATURE_OSPKE,
>> [XFEATURE_PASID] = X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
>> - [XFEATURE_CET_USER] = X86_FEATURE_SHSTK,
>> [XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG] = X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,
>> [XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA] = X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,
>> };
>> @@ -798,6 +797,14 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(unsigned int legacy_size)
>> fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features &= ~BIT_ULL(i);
>> }
>>
>> + /*
>> + * CET user mode xstate bit has been cleared by above sanity check.
>> + * Now pick it up if either SHSTK or IBT is available. Either feature
>> + * depends on the xstate bit to save/restore user mode states.
>> + */
>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
>> + fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features |= BIT_ULL(XFEATURE_CET_USER);
> So booting a host with "ibt=off" will clear the FEATURE_IBT, this was
> fine before this patch-set, but possibly not with.
>
> That kernel argument really only wants to tell the kernel not to use IBT
> itself, but not inhibit IBT from being used by guests.
Thanks for pointing this out!
If ibt=off actually causes XFEATURE_CET_USER unset in fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features, in KVM part (patch 24), we already have below check to disable SHSTK/IBT in this cases, so looks like it won't bring issues.
+if ((kvm_caps.supported_xss & (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER |
+XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) !=
+(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)) {
+kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_CET_USER;
+kvm_caps.supported_xss &= ~XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL;
+}
+
>
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