linux-kernel - [PATCH RFT v4 1/5] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW

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Message-Id: <20231128-clone3-shadow-stack-v4-1-8b28ffe4f676@kernel.org>
Date:   Tue, 28 Nov 2023 18:22:39 +0000
From:   Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
To:     "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>,
        Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@....com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
        Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
        Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
        Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@...hat.com>,
        Valentin Schneider <vschneid@...hat.com>,
        Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, jannh@...gle.com,
        bsegall@...gle.com, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFT v4 1/5] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK

Since multiple architectures have support for shadow stacks and we need to
select support for this feature in several places in the generic code
provide a generic config option that the architectures can select.

Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig   | 1 +
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +-
 include/linux/mm.h | 2 +-
 mm/Kconfig         | 6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 3762f41bb092..14b7703a9a2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1952,6 +1952,7 @@ config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
 	depends on AS_WRUSS
 	depends on X86_64
 	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	select ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
 	select X86_CET
 	help
 	  Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index ef2eb12906da..f0a904aeee8e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)]	= "ui",
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
 		[ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)] = "ss",
 #endif
 	};
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 418d26608ece..10462f354614 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 #endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
 /*
  * VM_SHADOW_STACK should not be set with VM_SHARED because of lack of
  * support core mm.
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 89971a894b60..6713bb3b0b48 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -1270,6 +1270,12 @@ config LOCK_MM_AND_FIND_VMA
 	bool
 	depends on !STACK_GROWSUP
 
+config ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+	bool
+	help
+	  The architecture has hardware support for userspace shadow call
+          stacks (eg, x86 CET, arm64 GCS or RISC-V Zicfiss).
+
 source "mm/damon/Kconfig"
 
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