linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 17/19] heki: x86: Update permissions counters during text patching

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Date:   Thu, 30 Nov 2023 12:33:15 +0100
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To:     "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>
Cc:     Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Alexander Graf <graf@...zon.com>,
        Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Forrest Yuan Yu <yuanyu@...gle.com>,
        James Gowans <jgowans@...zon.com>,
        James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        John Andersen <john.s.andersen@...el.com>,
        Marian Rotariu <marian.c.rotariu@...il.com>,
        Mihai Donțu <mdontu@...defender.com>,
        Nicușor Cîțu <nicu.citu@...oud.com>,
        Thara Gopinath <tgopinath@...rosoft.com>,
        Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@...cinc.com>,
        Wei Liu <wei.liu@...nel.org>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Zahra Tarkhani <ztarkhani@...rosoft.com>,
        Ștefan Șicleru <ssicleru@...defender.com>,
        dev@...ts.cloudhypervisor.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, qemu-devel@...gnu.org,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, x86@...nel.org,
        xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 17/19] heki: x86: Update permissions counters
 during text patching

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 03:07:15PM -0600, Madhavan T. Venkataraman wrote:

> Kernel Lockdown
> ---------------
> 
> But, we must provide at least some security in V2. Otherwise, it is useless.
> 
> So, we have implemented what we call a kernel lockdown. At the end of kernel
> boot, Heki establishes permissions in the extended page table as mentioned
> before. Also, it adds an immutable attribute for kernel text and kernel RO data.
> Beyond that point, guest requests that attempt to modify permissions on any of
> the immutable pages will be denied.
> 
> This means that features like FTrace and KProbes will not work on kernel text
> in V2. This is a temporary limitation. Once authentication is in place, the
> limitation will go away.

So either you're saying your patch 17 / text_poke is broken (so why
include it ?!?) or your statement above is incorrect. Pick one.


> __text_poke()
> 	This function is called by various features to patch text.
> 	This calls heki_text_poke_start() and heki_text_poke_end().
> 
> 	heki_text_poke_start() is called to add write permissions to the
> 	extended page table so that text can be patched. heki_text_poke_end()
> 	is called to revert write permissions in the extended page table.

This, if text_poke works, then static_call / jump_label / ftrace and
everything else should work, they all rely on this.


> Peter mentioned the following:
> 
> "if you want to mirror the native PTEs why don't you hook into the
> paravirt page-table muck and get all that for free?"
> 
> We did consider using a shadow page table kind of approach so that guest page table
> modifications can be intercepted and reflected in the page table entry. We did not
> do this for two reasons:
> 
> - there are bits in the page table entry that are not permission bits. We would like
>   the guest kernel to be able to modify them directly.

This statement makes no sense.

> - we cannot tell a genuine request from an attack.

Why not? How is an explicit call different from an explicit call in a
paravirt hook?

>From a maintenance pov we already hate paravirt with a passion, but it
is ever so much better than sprinkling yet another pile of crap
(heki_*) around.