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Message-ID: <656e6f0aa1c5_4568a29451@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com.notmuch>
Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2023 16:30:02 -0800
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 48/50] KVM: SEV: Provide support for
SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
[ add Dan Middleton for his awareness ]
Dionna Amalie Glaze wrote:
> > > So we're sort of complicating the more common case to support a more niche
> > > one (as far as userspace is concerned anyway; as far as kernel goes, your
> > > approach is certainly simplest :)).
> > >
> > > Instead, maybe a compromise is warranted so the requirements on userspace
> > > side are less complicated for a more basic deployment:
> > >
> > > 1) If /dev/sev is used to set a global certificate, then that will be
> > > used unconditionally by KVM, protected by simple dumb mutex during
> > > usage/update.
> > > 2) If /dev/sev is not used to set the global certificate is the value
> > > is NULL, we assume userspace wants full responsibility for managing
> > > certificates and exit to userspace to request the certs in the manner
> > > you suggested.
> > >
> > > Sean, Dionna, would this cover your concerns and address the certificate
> > > update use-case?
> >
> > Honestly, no. I see zero reason for the kernel to be involved. IIUC, there's no
> > privileged operations that require kernel intervention, which means that shoving
> > a global cert into /dev/sev is using the CCP driver as middleman. Just use a
> > userspace daemon. I have a very hard time believing that passing around large-ish
> > blobs of data in userspace isn't already a solved problem.
>
> ping sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com and +Dan Williams
Apologies Dionna, I missed this earlier.
>
> I think for a uniform experience for all coco technologies, we need
> someone from Intel to weigh in on supporting auxblob through a similar
> vmexit. Whereas the quoting enclave gets its PCK cert installed by the
> host, something like the firmware's SBOM [1] could be delivered in
> auxblob. The proposal to embed the compressed SBOM binary in a coff
> section of the UEFI doesn't get it communicated to user space, so this
> is a good place to get that info about the expected TDMR in. The SBOM
> proposal itself would need additional modeling in the coRIM profile to
> have extra coco-specific measurements or we need to find some other
> method of getting this info bundled with the attestation report.
SBOM looks different than the SEV use case of @auxblob to convey a
certificate chain.
Are you asking for @auxblob to be SBOM on TDX and a certchain on SEV, or
unifying the @auxblob format on SBOM?
> My own plan for SEV-SNP was to have a bespoke signed measurement of
> the UEFI in the GUID table, but that doesn't extend to TDX. If we're
> looking more at an industry alignment on coRIM for SBOM formats (yes
> please), then it'd be great to start getting that kind of info plumbed
> to the user in a uniform way that doesn't have to rely on servers
> providing the endorsements.
>
> [1] https://uefi.org/blog/firmware-sbom-proposal
Honestly my first reaction for this ABI would be for a new file under
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars or similar.
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