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Message-ID: <7aefd87764ba8962de85250ff92b82800550401b.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 06 Dec 2023 11:11:08 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, brauner@...nel.org,
chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, neilb@...e.de,
kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
casey@...aufler-ca.com, mic@...ikod.net,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 23/23] integrity: Switch from rbtree to LSM-managed
blob for integrity_iint_cache
On Wed, 2023-12-06 at 14:10 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-12-04 at 14:26 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
...
> > If the result of this patch set should be that IMA and EVM become
> > proper LSMs without the shared integrity layer, instead of collapsing
> > all changes in this patch set, I think we should first verify if IMA
> > and EVM can be really independent. Once we guarantee that, we can
> > proceed making the proper LSMs.
> >
> > These are the changes I have in mind:
> >
> > 1) Fix evm_verifyxattr(), and make it work without integrity_iint_cache
> > 2) Remove the integrity_iint_cache parameter from evm_verifyxattr(),
> > since the other callers are not going to use it
>
> Ehm, I checked better.
>
> integrity_inode_get() is public too (although it is not exported). So,
> a caller (not IMA) could do:
>
> iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
> status = evm_verifyxattr(..., iint);
>
> However, it should not call integrity_inode_free(), which is also in
> include/linux/integrity.h, since this is going to be called by
> security_inode_free() (currently).
Calling integrity_inode_free() directly would release the iint early.
As a result, IMA would then need to re-allocate it on next access.
Other than impacting IMA's performance, is this a problem?
> > 3) Create an internal function with the original parameters to be used
> > by IMA
> > 4) Introduce evm_post_path_mknod(), which similarly to
> > ima_post_path_mknod(), sets IMA_NEW_FILE for new files
>
> I just realized that also this is changing the current behavior.
>
> IMA would clear IMA_NEW_FILE in ima_check_last_writer(), while EVM
> wouldn't (unless we implement the file_release hook in EVM too).
True
Mimi
> > 5) Add hardcoded call to evm_post_path_mknod() after
> > ima_post_path_mknod() in security.c
> >
> > If we think that this is good enough, we proceed with the move of IMA
> > and EVM functions to the LSM infrastructure (patches v7 19-21).
> >
> > The next patches are going to be similar to patches v6 22-23, but
> > unlike those, their goal would be simply to split metadata, not to make
> > IMA and EVM independent, which at this point has been addressed
> > separately in the prerequisite patches.
> >
> > The final patch is to remove the 'integrity' LSM and the integrity
> > metadata management code, which now is not used anymore.
> >
> > Would that work?
>
> We are not making much progress, I'm going to follow any recommendation
> that would move this forward.
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