linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH v13 26/35] x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code

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Date:   Wed, 6 Dec 2023 07:45:31 +0000
From:   "Li, Xin3" <xin3.li@...el.com>
To:     "andrew.cooper3@...rix.com" <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-edac@...r.kernel.org" <linux-edac@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>
CC:     "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
        "dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Lutomirski, Andy" <luto@...nel.org>,
        "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        "seanjc@...gle.com" <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Gross, Jurgen" <jgross@...e.com>,
        "Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        "mhiramat@...nel.org" <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        "jiangshanlai@...il.com" <jiangshanlai@...il.com>,
        "nik.borisov@...e.com" <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
        "Kang, Shan" <shan.kang@...el.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v13 26/35] x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code

> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c b/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
> > new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..215883e90f94
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_fred.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
> > ...
> > +static noinstr void fred_intx(struct pt_regs *regs) {
> > +	switch (regs->fred_ss.vector) {
> > +	/* INT0 */
> 
> INTO (for overflow), not INT-zero.  However...

My bad again...

> > +	case X86_TRAP_OF:
> > +		exc_overflow(regs);
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	/* INT3 */
> > +	case X86_TRAP_BP:
> > +		exc_int3(regs);
> > +		return;
> 
> ... neither OF nor BP will ever enter fred_intx() because they're type SWEXC not
> SWINT.

Per FRED spec 5.0, section 7.3 Software Interrupts and Related Instructions:
INT n (opcode CD followed by an immediate byte): There are 256 such
software interrupt instructions, one for each value n of the immediate
byte (0–255).

And appendix B Event Stack Levels:
If the event is an execution of INT n (opcode CD n for 8-bit value n),
the event stack level is 0. The event type is 4 (software interrupt)
and the vector is n.

So int $0x4 and int $0x3 (use asm(".byte 0xCD, 0x03")) get here.

But into (0xCE) and int3 (0xCC) do use event type SWEXC. 

BTW, into is NOT allowed in 64-bit mode but "int $0x4" is allowed.

> 
> SWINT is strictly the INT $imm8 instruction.
> 
> > ...
> > +static noinstr void fred_extint(struct pt_regs *regs) {
> > +	unsigned int vector = regs->fred_ss.vector;
> > +
> > +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vector < FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR))
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	if (likely(vector >= FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR)) {
> > +		irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);
> > +
> > +		instrumentation_begin();
> > +		sysvec_table[vector - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR](regs);
> 
> array_index_mask_nospec()
> 
> This is easy for an attacker to abuse, to install non-function-pointer targets into
> the indirect predictor.

HPA did use array_index_nospec() at the beginning, but I forgot it later.

> 
> > +		instrumentation_end();
> > +		irqentry_exit(regs, state);
> > +	} else {
> > +		common_interrupt(regs, vector);
> > +	}
> > +}
> > +
> > +static noinstr void fred_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned
> > +long error_code) {
> > +	/* Optimize for #PF. That's the only exception which matters performance
> wise */
> > +	if (likely(regs->fred_ss.vector == X86_TRAP_PF)) {
> > +		exc_page_fault(regs, error_code);
> > +		return;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	switch (regs->fred_ss.vector) {
> > +	case X86_TRAP_DE: return exc_divide_error(regs);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_DB: return fred_exc_debug(regs);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_BP: return exc_int3(regs);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_OF: return exc_overflow(regs);
> 
> Depending on what you want to do with BP/OF vs fred_intx(), this may need
> adjusting.
> 
> If you are cross-checking type and vector, then these should be rejected for not
> being of type HWEXC.

You're right, the event type needs to be SWEXC for into and int3.

However, would it be overkilling?  Assuming hardware and VMM are sane.

> 
> > +	case X86_TRAP_BR: return exc_bounds(regs);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_UD: return exc_invalid_op(regs);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_NM: return exc_device_not_available(regs);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_DF: return exc_double_fault(regs, error_code);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_TS: return exc_invalid_tss(regs, error_code);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_NP: return exc_segment_not_present(regs, error_code);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_SS: return exc_stack_segment(regs, error_code);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_GP: return exc_general_protection(regs, error_code);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_MF: return exc_coprocessor_error(regs);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_AC: return exc_alignment_check(regs, error_code);
> > +	case X86_TRAP_XF: return exc_simd_coprocessor_error(regs);
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
> > +	case X86_TRAP_MC: return fred_exc_machine_check(regs); #endif #ifdef
> > +CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
> > +	case X86_TRAP_VE: return exc_virtualization_exception(regs);
> > +#endif
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
> 
> CONFIG_X86_CET
> 
> Userspace can use CET even if the kernel isn't compiled with IBT, so this
> exception needs handling.

Absolutely correct!

> 
> > +	case X86_TRAP_CP: return exc_control_protection(regs, error_code);
> > +#endif
> > +	default: return fred_bad_type(regs, error_code);
> > +	}
> > +}
> > +
> > +__visible noinstr void fred_entry_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs) {
> > +	unsigned long error_code = regs->orig_ax;
> > +
> > +	/* Invalidate orig_ax so that syscall_get_nr() works correctly */
> > +	regs->orig_ax = -1;
> > +
> > +	switch (regs->fred_ss.type) {
> > +	case EVENT_TYPE_EXTINT:
> > +		return fred_extint(regs);
> > +	case EVENT_TYPE_NMI:
> > +		return fred_exc_nmi(regs);
> > +	case EVENT_TYPE_SWINT:
> > +		return fred_intx(regs);
> > +	case EVENT_TYPE_HWEXC:
> > +	case EVENT_TYPE_SWEXC:
> > +	case EVENT_TYPE_PRIV_SWEXC:
> > +		return fred_exception(regs, error_code);
> 
> PRIV_SWEXC should have it's own function and not fall into fred_exception().
> 
> It is strictly only the ICEBP (INT1) instruction at the moment, so should fall into
> bad_type() for any vector other than X86_TRAP_DB.

Good point!

It's like NMI, one event type with only one valid event vector now.

> 
> > +	case EVENT_TYPE_OTHER:
> > +		return fred_other(regs);
> > +	default:
> > +		return fred_bad_type(regs, error_code);
> > +	}
> > +}
> 
> ~Andrew

Thanks!
    Xin