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Message-ID: <fdd11528-b0f8-48af-8141-15c4b1b01c65@linux.dev>
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 21:01:58 +0800
From: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@...ux.dev>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] mm/slub: free KFENCE objects in slab_free_hook()
On 2023/12/6 17:58, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> On 12/5/23 14:27, Chengming Zhou wrote:
>> On 2023/12/5 03:34, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
>>> When freeing an object that was allocated from KFENCE, we do that in the
>>> slowpath __slab_free(), relying on the fact that KFENCE "slab" cannot be
>>> the cpu slab, so the fastpath has to fallback to the slowpath.
>>>
>>> This optimization doesn't help much though, because is_kfence_address()
>>> is checked earlier anyway during the free hook processing or detached
>>> freelist building. Thus we can simplify the code by making the
>>> slab_free_hook() free the KFENCE object immediately, similarly to KASAN
>>> quarantine.
>>>
>>> In slab_free_hook() we can place kfence_free() above init processing, as
>>> callers have been making sure to set init to false for KFENCE objects.
>>> This simplifies slab_free(). This places it also above kasan_slab_free()
>>> which is ok as that skips KFENCE objects anyway.
>>>
>>> While at it also determine the init value in slab_free_freelist_hook()
>>> outside of the loop.
>>>
>>> This change will also make introducing per cpu array caches easier.
>>>
>>> Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
>>> ---
>>> mm/slub.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
>>> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>>> index ed2fa92e914c..e38c2b712f6c 100644
>>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>>> @@ -2039,7 +2039,7 @@ static inline void memcg_slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab,
>>> * production configuration these hooks all should produce no code at all.
>>> *
>>> * Returns true if freeing of the object can proceed, false if its reuse
>>> - * was delayed by KASAN quarantine.
>>> + * was delayed by KASAN quarantine, or it was returned to KFENCE.
>>> */
>>> static __always_inline
>>> bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init)
>>> @@ -2057,6 +2057,9 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init)
>>> __kcsan_check_access(x, s->object_size,
>>> KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT);
>>>
>>> + if (kfence_free(kasan_reset_tag(x)))
>>
>> I'm wondering if "kasan_reset_tag()" is needed here?
>
> I think so, because AFAICS the is_kfence_address() check in kfence_free()
> could be a false negative otherwise. In fact now I even question some of the
Ok.
> other is_kfence_address() checks in mm/slub.c, mainly
> build_detached_freelist() which starts from pointers coming directly from
> slab users. Insight from KASAN/KFENCE folks appreciated :)
>
I know very little about KASAN/KFENCE, looking forward to their insight. :)
Just saw a check in __kasan_slab_alloc():
if (is_kfence_address(object))
return (void *)object;
So thought it seems that a kfence object would be skipped by KASAN.
Thanks!
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