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Message-ID: <26313af3-3a75-4a3c-9935-526b07a6277d@intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 8 Dec 2023 23:15:39 +0800
From:   "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To:     Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
CC:     <seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        <dave.hansen@...el.com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
        <chao.gao@...el.com>, <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        <john.allen@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest

On 12/7/2023 1:24 AM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-12-06 at 17:22 +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
>> On 12/5/2023 6:12 PM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2023-12-04 at 16:50 +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
>> [...]
>>
>>>>>>     	vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = false;
>>>>>> @@ -2469,6 +2491,18 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_rare(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>>>>>     		if (kvm_mpx_supported() && vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
>>>>>>     		    (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
>>>>>>     			vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +		if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
>>>>> I don't think that nested.nested_run_pending check is needed.
>>>>> prepare_vmcs02_rare is not going to be called unless the nested run is pending.
>>>> But there're other paths along to call prepare_vmcs02_rare(), e.g., vmx_set_nested_state()-> nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode()-> prepare_vmcs02_rare(), especially when L1 instead of L2 was running. In this case, nested.nested_run_pending == false,
>>>> we don't need to update vmcs02's fields at the point until L2 is being resumed.
>>> - If we restore VM from migration stream when L2 is *not running*, then prepare_vmcs02_rare won't be called,
>>> because nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode will not be called, because in turn there is no nested vmcs to load.
>>>
>>> - If we restore VM from migration stream when L2 is *about to run* (KVM emulated the VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH,
>>> but we didn't do the actual hardware VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME on vmcs02, then the 'nested_run_pending' will be true, it will be restored
>>> from the migration stream.
>>>
>>> - If we migrate while nested guest was run once but didn't VMEXIT to L1 yet, then yes, nested.nested_run_pending will be false indeed,
>>> but we still need to setup vmcs02, otherwise it will be left with default zero values.
>> Thanks a lot for recapping these cases! I overlooked some nested flags before. It makes sense to remove nested.nested_run_pending.
>>> Remember that prior to setting nested state the VM wasn't running even once usually, unlike when the guest enters nested state normally.
>>>
>>>>>> +		    (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)) {
>>>>>> +			if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
>>>>>> +				vmcs_writel(GUEST_SSP, vmcs12->guest_ssp);
>>>>>> +				vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE,
>>>>>> +					    vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl);
>>>>>> +			}
>>>>>> +			if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
>>>>>> +			    guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
>>>>>> +				vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, vmcs12->guest_s_cet);
>>>>>> +		}
>>>>>>     	}
>>>>>>     
>>>>>>     	if (nested_cpu_has_xsaves(vmcs12))
>>>>>> @@ -4300,6 +4334,15 @@ static void sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>>>>     	vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions =
>>>>>>     		vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS);
>>>>>>     
>>>>>> +	if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
>>>>>> +		vmcs12->guest_ssp = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);
>>>>>> +		vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
>>>>>> +	}
>>>>>> +	if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
>>>>>> +	    guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
>>>>>> +		vmcs12->guest_s_cet = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
>>>>>> +	}
>>>>> The above code should be conditional on VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE - if the guest (L2) state
>>>>> was loaded, then it must be updated on exit - this is usually how VMX works.
>>>> I think this is not for L2 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE, it happens in prepare_vmcs02_rare(). IIUC, the guest registers will be saved into VMCS fields unconditionally when vm-exit happens,
>>>> so these fields for L2 guest should be synced to L1 unconditionally.
>>> "the guest registers will be saved into VMCS fields unconditionally"
>>> This is not true, unless there is a bug.
>> I checked the latest SDM, there's no such kind of wording regarding CET entry/exit control bits. The wording comes from
>> the individual CET spec.:
>> "10.6 VM Exit
>> On processors that support CET, the VM exit saves the state of IA32_S_CET, SSP and IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR MSR to the VMCS guest-state area unconditionally."
>> But since it doesn't appear in SDM, I shouldn't take it for granted.
> SDM spec from September 2023:
>
> 28.3.1 Saving Control Registers, Debug Registers, and MSRs
>
> "If the processor supports the 1-setting of the “load CET” VM-entry control, the contents of the IA32_S_CET and
> IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR MSRs are saved into the corresponding fields. On processors that do not
> support Intel 64 architecture, bits 63:32 of these MSRs are not saved."
>
> Honestly it's not 100% clear if the “load CET” should be set to 1 to trigger the restore, or that this control just needs to be
> supported on the CPU.
> It does feel like you are right here, that CPU always saves the guest state, but allows to not load it on VM entry via
> “load CET” VM entry control.
>
> IMHO its best to check what the bare metal does by rigging a test by patching the host kernel to not set the 'load CET' control,
> and see if the CPU still updates the guest CET fields on the VM exit.

OK, I'll do some tests to see what's happening, thanks!
>>> the vmcs12 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE should be passed through as is to vmcs02, so if the nested guest doesn't set this bit
>>> the entry/exit using vmcs02 will not touch the CET state, which is unusual but allowed by the spec I think - a nested hypervisor can opt for example to save/load
>>> this state manually or use msr load/store lists instead.
>> Right although the use case should be rare, will modify the code to check VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE. Thanks!
>
>>> Regardless of this,
>>> if the guest didn't set VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE, then vmcs12 guest fields should neither be loaded on VM entry (copied to vmcs02) nor updated on VM exit,
>>> (that is copied back to vmcs12) this is what is written in the VMX spec.
>> What's the VMX spec. your're referring to here?
> SDM.
>
> In fact, now that I am thinking about this again, it should be OK to unconditionally copy the CET fields from vmcs12 to vmcs02, because as long as the
> VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE is not set, the CPU should care about their values in the vmcs02.
>
> And about the other way around, assuming that I made a mistake as I said above, then the other way around is indeed unconditional.
>
>
> Sorry for a bit of a confusion.

NP, I also double check it with HW Arch and get it back.
Thanks for raising these questions!

> Best regards,
> 	Maxim Levitsky
>
>
>>
>

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