linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/2] x86: UMIP emulation leaking kernel addresses

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Sun, 10 Dec 2023 18:08:43 +0100
From:   Michal Luczaj <mhal@...x.co>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, shuah@...nel.org, luto@...nel.org,
        torvalds@...uxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] x86: UMIP emulation leaking kernel addresses

On 12/9/23 16:53, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 06, 2023 at 01:43:43AM +0100, Michal Luczaj wrote:
>> Introducing a DPL check in insn_get_seg_base(), or even in get_desc(),
>> seems enough to prevent the decoder from disclosing data.
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
>> index 558a605929db..4c1eea736519 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
>> @@ -725,6 +725,18 @@ unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)
>>  	if (!get_desc(&desc, sel))
>>  		return -1L;
>>  
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Some segment selectors coming from @regs do not necessarily reflect
>> +	 * the state of CPU; see get_segment_selector(). Their values might
>> +	 * have been altered by ptrace. Thus, the instruction decoder can be
>> +	 * tricked into "dereferencing" a segment descriptor that would
>> +	 * otherwise cause a CPU exception -- for example due to mismatched
>> +	 * privilege levels. This opens up the possibility to expose kernel
>> +	 * space base address of DPL=0 segments.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (desc.dpl < (regs->cs & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
>> +		return -1L;
>> +
>>  	return get_desc_base(&desc);
>>  }
>>  
>> That said, I guess instead of trying to harden the decoder,
> 
> Well, here's what my CPU manual says:
> 
> "4.10.1 Accessing Data Segments
> 
> ...
> 
> The processor compares the effective privilege level with the DPL in the
> descriptor-table entry referenced by the segment selector. If the
> effective privilege level is greater than or equal to (numerically
> lower-than or equal-to) the DPL, then the processor loads the segment
> register with the data-segment selector. 
> 
> If the effective privilege level is lower than (numerically
> greater-than) the DPL, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs and
> the segment register is not loaded.
> 
> ...
> 
> 4.10.2 Accessing Stack Segments
> 
> The processor compares the CPL with the DPL in the descriptor-table
> entry referenced by the segment selector. The two values must be equal.
> If they are not equal, a #GP occurs and the SS register is not loaded."
>
> So *actually* doing those checks in the insn decoder is the proper thing
> to do, IMNSVHO.

Are you suggesting checking only CPL vs. DPL or making sure the insn
decoder faithfully emulates all the other stuff CPU does? Like the desc.s
issue described below.

>> Now, I'm far from being competent, but here's an idea I've tried: tell
>> the #GP handler that UMIP-related exceptions come only as #GP(0):
>>
>>  	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP)) {
>> -		if (user_mode(regs) && fixup_umip_exception(regs))
>> +		if (user_mode(regs) && !error_code && fixup_umip_exception(regs))
>>  			goto exit;
>>  	}
> 
> And yap, as you've realized, that alone doesn't fix the leaking.

With this fix applied, I can't see any way to sufficiently confuse the
UMIP emulation with a non-ESPFIX bad IRET. It appears that #GP(selector)
takes precedence over #GP(0), so tripping IRET with any malformed selector
always ends up with #GP handler's error_code != 0, even if conditions were
met for #GP(0) just as well. Is there something I'm missing?

That said, there's still the case of #DF handler feeding #GP handler after
a fault in ESPFIX. Consider

	cs = (GDT_ENTRY_TSS << 3) | USER_RPL
	ss = (SOME_LDT_ENTRY << 3) | SEGMENT_LDT | USER_RPL
	ip = "sgdt %cs:(%reg)"

Attempting IRET with such illegal CS raises #GP(selector), but (because of
ESPFIX) this #GP is promoted to #DF where it becomes #GP(0). And UMIP
emulation is triggered.

UMIP emulator starts by fetching code from user. insn decoder does
`copy_from_user(buf, (void __user *)ip, MAX_INSN_SIZE)` where `ip` is
CS.base+IP and CS.base here is actually a (part of) GDT_ENTRY_TSS.base, a
kernel address. With IP under user's control, no fault while copying.

Next, insn_get_code_seg_params() concludes that, given TSS as a code
segment, address and operand size are both 16-bit. Prefix SGDT with size
overrides, and we're back to 32-bit. Then insn_get_addr_ref() and
copy_to_user() does the leaking.

I don't know if/how to deal with ESPFIX losing #GP's error code. As for
telling insn decoder that system segments aren't code:

--- a/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c
@@ -809,6 +809,10 @@ int insn_get_code_seg_params(struct pt_regs *regs)
        if (!get_desc(&desc, sel))
                return -EINVAL;

+       /* System segments are not code. */
+       if (!desc.s)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
        /*
         * The most significant byte of the Type field of the segment descriptor
         * determines whether a segment contains data or code. If this is a data

Is this something in the right direction?

(Note, get_segment_selector() is broken for selectors with the high bit
set. I'll send patch later.)

thanks,
Michal