| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <f1e37bbf-a98c-4090-bc48-05bdae58cbf9@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2023 19:45:39 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
ardb@...nel.org, seanjc@...gle.com, vkuznets@...hat.com,
jmattson@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
slp@...hat.com, pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, bp@...en8.de,
vbabka@...e.cz, kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com,
tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, alpergun@...gle.com,
jarkko@...nel.org, ashish.kalra@....com, nikunj.dadhania@....com,
pankaj.gupta@....com, liam.merwick@...cle.com,
zhi.a.wang@...el.com, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 23/50] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB
memory allocation SNP safe
On 10/16/23 15:27, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>
> Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly
> signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the
> RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page.
>
> When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC
> backing pages as "in-use" via a reserved bit in the corresponding RMP
> entry after a successful VMRUN. This is done for _all_ VMs, not just
> SNP-Active VMs.
>
> If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable
> translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP
> hardware, if an in-use page is 2mb aligned and software accesses any
> part of the associated 2mb region with a hupage, the CPU will
> incorrectly treat the entire 2mb region as in-use and signal a spurious
> RMP violation #PF.
>
> The recommended is to not use the hugepage for the VMCB, VMSA or
> AVIC backing page for similar reasons. Add a generic allocator that will
> ensure that the page returns is not hugepage (2mb or 1gb) and is safe to
> be used when SEV-SNP is enabled. Also implement similar handling for the
> VMCB/VMSA pages of nested guests.
>
> Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
> Reported-by: Alper Gun <alpergun@...gle.com> # for nested VMSA case
> Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> [mdr: squash in nested guest handling from Ashish]
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Based on the discussion with Borislav, please move this earlier in the
series, before patch 6.
Paolo
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 5 ++++-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++++++---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
> 7 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index f1505a5fa781..4ef2eca14287 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_prepare)
> KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(gmem_invalidate)
> +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(alloc_apic_backing_page)
>
> #undef KVM_X86_OP
> #undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index fa401cb1a552..a3983271ea28 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1763,6 +1763,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
>
> int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
> void (*gmem_invalidate)(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
> + void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> };
>
> struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> index dcd60b39e794..631a554c0f48 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> @@ -2810,7 +2810,10 @@ int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns)
>
> vcpu->arch.apic = apic;
>
> - apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page)
> + apic->regs = static_call(kvm_x86_alloc_apic_backing_page)(vcpu);
> + else
> + apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> if (!apic->regs) {
> printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n",
> vcpu->vcpu_id);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> index dd496c9e5f91..1f9a3f9eb985 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
> @@ -1194,7 +1194,7 @@ int svm_allocate_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> if (svm->nested.initialized)
> return 0;
>
> - vmcb02_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> + vmcb02_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(&svm->vcpu);
> if (!vmcb02_page)
> return -ENOMEM;
> svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr = page_address(vmcb02_page);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 088b32657f46..1cfb9232fc74 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -3211,3 +3211,36 @@ void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
> break;
> }
> }
> +
> +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + unsigned long pfn;
> + struct page *p;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> + return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> +
> + /*
> + * Allocate an SNP safe page to workaround the SNP erratum where
> + * the CPU will incorrectly signal an RMP violation #PF if a
> + * hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the RMP entry of VMCB, VMSA
> + * or AVIC backing page. The recommeded workaround is to not use the
> + * hugepage.
> + *
> + * Allocate one extra page, use a page which is not 2mb aligned
> + * and free the other.
> + */
> + p = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 1);
> + if (!p)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + split_page(p, 1);
> +
> + pfn = page_to_pfn(p);
> + if (IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD))
> + __free_page(p++);
> + else
> + __free_page(p + 1);
> +
> + return p;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 1e7fb1ea45f7..8e4ef0cd968a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
> int ret = -ENOMEM;
>
> memset(sd, 0, sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data));
> - sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
> + sd->save_area = snp_safe_alloc_page(NULL);
> if (!sd->save_area)
> return ret;
>
> @@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>
> err = -ENOMEM;
> - vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> + vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
> if (!vmcb01_page)
> goto out;
>
> @@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
> * the encrypted register state of the guest.
> */
> - vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> + vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
> if (!vmsa_page)
> goto error_free_vmcb_page;
>
> @@ -4876,6 +4876,16 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + struct page *page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
> +
> + if (!page)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + return page_address(page);
> +}
> +
> static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
>
> @@ -5007,6 +5017,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
>
> .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> .vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
> + .alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
> };
>
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index c13070d00910..b7b8bf73cbb9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
> void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
> void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
> void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
> +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
> /* vmenter.S */
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists