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Message-ID: <0b2eb374-356c-46c6-9c4a-9512fbfece7a@redhat.com>
Date:   Wed, 13 Dec 2023 13:51:58 +0100
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:     Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
        ardb@...nel.org, seanjc@...gle.com, vkuznets@...hat.com,
        jmattson@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
        slp@...hat.com, pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
        srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
        dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, bp@...en8.de,
        vbabka@...e.cz, kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com,
        tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, alpergun@...gle.com,
        jarkko@...nel.org, ashish.kalra@....com, nikunj.dadhania@....com,
        pankaj.gupta@....com, liam.merwick@...cle.com,
        zhi.a.wang@...el.com, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...fian.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 04/50] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature

On 10/16/23 15:27, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> 
> Add CPU feature detection for Secure Encrypted Virtualization with
> Secure Nested Paging. This feature adds a strong memory integrity
> protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like
> data replay, memory re-mapping, and more.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...fian.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>

Queued, thanks.

Paolo

> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h       | 1 +
>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                | 5 +++--
>   tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
>   3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 58cb9495e40f..1640cedd77f1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -437,6 +437,7 @@
>   #define X86_FEATURE_SEV			(19*32+ 1) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH	(19*32+ 2) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		(19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP		(19*32+ 4) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Secure Nested Paging */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX		(19*32+ 9) /* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	(19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP		(19*32+14) /* AMD SEV-ES full debug state swap support */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> index dd8379d84445..14ee7f750cc7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
> @@ -630,8 +630,8 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>   	 *	      SME feature (set in scattered.c).
>   	 *	      If the kernel has not enabled SME via any means then
>   	 *	      don't advertise the SME feature.
> -	 *   For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise the
> -	 *            SEV and SEV_ES feature (set in scattered.c).
> +	 *   For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise SEV and
> +	 *	      any additional functionality based on it.
>   	 *
>   	 *   In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
>   	 *   don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
> @@ -666,6 +666,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>   clear_sev:
>   		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
>   		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
> +		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
>   	}
>   }
>   
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 798e60b5454b..669f45eefa0c 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -432,6 +432,7 @@
>   #define X86_FEATURE_SEV			(19*32+ 1) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH	(19*32+ 2) /* "" VM Page Flush MSR is supported */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES		(19*32+ 3) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP		(19*32+ 4) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Secure Nested Paging */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX		(19*32+ 9) /* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT	(19*32+10) /* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */
>   #define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP		(19*32+14) /* AMD SEV-ES full debug state swap support */

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