linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v10 23/50] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Wed, 13 Dec 2023 14:31:37 +0100
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:     Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
        ardb@...nel.org, seanjc@...gle.com, vkuznets@...hat.com,
        jmattson@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
        slp@...hat.com, pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
        srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
        dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, bp@...en8.de,
        vbabka@...e.cz, kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com,
        tony.luck@...el.com, marcorr@...gle.com,
        sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, alpergun@...gle.com,
        jarkko@...nel.org, ashish.kalra@....com, nikunj.dadhania@....com,
        pankaj.gupta@....com, liam.merwick@...cle.com,
        zhi.a.wang@...el.com, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 23/50] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB
 memory allocation SNP safe

On 10/16/23 15:27, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> 
> Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly
> signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the
> RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page.
> 
> When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC
> backing pages as "in-use" via a reserved bit in the corresponding RMP
> entry after a successful VMRUN. This is done for _all_ VMs, not just
> SNP-Active VMs.
> 
> If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable
> translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP
> hardware, if an in-use page is 2mb aligned and software accesses any
> part of the associated 2mb region with a hupage, the CPU will
> incorrectly treat the entire 2mb region as in-use and signal a spurious
> RMP violation #PF.

I don't understand if this can happen even if SEV-SNP is not in use, 
just because it is supported on the host?  If so, should this be Cc'd to 
stable?  (I can tweak the wording and submit it).

Paolo