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Message-ID: <20231215221636.105680-39-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 14:16:32 -0800
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: casey@...aufler-ca.com,
paul@...l-moore.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com,
keescook@...omium.org,
john.johansen@...onical.com,
penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
mic@...ikod.net
Subject: [PATCH v39 38/42] LSM: Correct handling of ENOSYS in inode_setxattr
The usual "bail on fail" behavior of LSM hooks doesn't
work for security_inode_setxattr(). Modules are allowed
to return -ENOSYS if the attribute specified isn't one
they manage. Fix the code to accommodate this unusal case.
This requires changes to the hooks in SELinux and Smack.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
---
security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++--------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ++-----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 10 +++++-----
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 64cdf0e09832..b1a849e8589c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2346,24 +2346,25 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- int ret;
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = -ENOSYS;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- /*
- * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
- * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
- */
- ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name, value,
- size, flags);
- if (ret == 1)
- ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setxattr, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size,
+ flags);
+ if (rc != -ENOSYS)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (rc == -ENOSYS)
+ rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 46dee63eec12..4ac4b536c568 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3207,13 +3207,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
int rc = 0;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
- rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
ordinary setattr permission. */
- return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+ rc = dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+ return rc ? rc : -ENOSYS;
}
if (!selinux_initialized())
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 61bd3f626e7d..02b9aa200ad4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
rc = -EINVAL;
} else
- rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ rc = -ENOSYS;
if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
@@ -1354,11 +1354,11 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
rc = -EINVAL;
}
- smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
- smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
-
if (rc == 0) {
- rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)),
+ MAY_WRITE, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
}
--
2.41.0
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