Message-Id: <20231218170916.cd319dbcf83f2dd7da24e48f@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 17:09:16 +0100
From: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@...onical.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Cc: Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@...ec.fraunhofer.de>,
 Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander@...alicyn.com>, Alexei Starovoitov
 <ast@...nel.org>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Daniel Borkmann
 <daniel@...earbox.net>, Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, Martin KaFai
 Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>, Song Liu <song@...nel.org>, Yonghong Song
 <yhs@...com>, John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>, KP Singh
 <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>, Hao Luo
 <haoluo@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, Quentin Monnet
 <quentin@...valent.com>, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Miklos
 Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>, Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>,
 "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, gyroidos@...ec.fraunhofer.de
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/3] devguard: added device guard for mknod in
 non-initial userns

On Fri, 15 Dec 2023 17:36:12 +0100
Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 03:15:33PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 02:26:53PM +0100, Michael Weiß wrote:
> > > On 15.12.23 13:31, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Dec 13, 2023 at 03:38:13PM +0100, Michael Weiß wrote:
> > > >> devguard is a simple LSM to allow CAP_MKNOD in non-initial user
> > > >> namespace in cooperation of an attached cgroup device program. We
> > > >> just need to implement the security_inode_mknod() hook for this.
> > > >> In the hook, we check if the current task is guarded by a device
> > > >> cgroup using the lately introduced cgroup_bpf_current_enabled()
> > > >> helper. If so, we strip out SB_I_NODEV from the super block.
> > > >>
> > > >> Access decisions to those device nodes are then guarded by existing
> > > >> device cgroups mechanism.
> > > >>
> > > >> Signed-off-by: Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@...ec.fraunhofer.de>
> > > >> ---
> > > > 
> > > > I think you misunderstood me... My point was that I believe you don't
> > > > need an additional LSM at all and no additional LSM hook. But I might be
> > > > wrong. Only a POC would show.
> > > 
> > > Yeah sorry, I got your point now.
> > 
> > I think I might have had a misconception about how this works.
> > A bpf LSM program can't easily alter a kernel object such as struct
> > super_block I've been told.
> 
> Which is why you need that new hook in there. I get it now. In any case,
> I think we can do this slightly nicer (for some definition of nice)...
> 
> So the thing below moves the capability check for mknod into the
> security_inode_mknod() hook (This should be a separate patch.).
> 
> It moves raising SB_I_NODEV into security_sb_device_access() and the old
> semantics are retained if no LSM claims device management. If an LSM
> claims device management we raise the new flag and don't even raise
> SB_I_NODEV. The capability check is namespace aware if device management
> is claimed by an LSM. That's backward compatible. And we don't need any
> sysctl.
> 
> What's missing is that all devcgroup_*() calls should be moved into a
> new, unified security_device_access() hook that's called consistently in
> all places where that matters such as blkdev_get_by_dev() and so on. Let
> the bpf lsm implement that new hook.
> 
> Then write a sample BPF LSM as POC that this works. This would also
> all other LSMs to do device management if they wanted to.
> 
> Thoughts?

Dear colleagues,
Dear Christian,

As far as I understand Christian's idea is to remain mknod capability checks decoupled from the device cgroups checks.
It looks sane and less error prone.

So we want to:
- use BPF LSM sb_device_access hook to disable SB_I_NODEV raising for non-root-userns superblocks
- use BPF LSM inode_permission hook to actually filter if we want this device to be permitted or not (alternatively we can use device cgroup).

The only thing that is not clear to me about the sb_device_access hook is, what we can check inside it practically?
Yes, we have an access to struct super_block, but at this point this structure is not filled with anything useful. We only
can determine a filesystem type and that's all. It means that we can use this hook as a flag that says "ok, we do care about device permissions,
kernel, please do not set SB_I_NODEV for us". Am I correct?

Kind regards,
Alex

> 
> From 7f4177e4f87e0b0182022f114c0287a0f0985752 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 17:22:26 +0100
> Subject: [PATCH] UNTESTED, UNCOMPILED, PROBABLY BUGGY
> 
> Signed-off-and-definitely-neither-compiled-nor-tested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> ---
>  fs/namei.c                    |  5 -----
>  fs/namespace.c                | 11 +++++++----
>  fs/super.c                    |  6 ++++--
>  include/linux/fs.h            |  1 +
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  1 +
>  include/linux/security.h      | 15 ++++++++++++---
>  security/commoncap.c          | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
>  security/security.c           | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  8 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 71c13b2990b4..da481e6a696c 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -3959,16 +3959,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_path_create);
>  int vfs_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
>  	      struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
>  {
> -	bool is_whiteout = S_ISCHR(mode) && dev == WHITEOUT_DEV;
>  	int error = may_create(idmap, dir, dentry);
>  
>  	if (error)
>  		return error;
>  
> -	if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && !is_whiteout &&
> -	    !capable(CAP_MKNOD))
> -		return -EPERM;
> -
>  	if (!dir->i_op->mknod)
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index fbf0e596fcd3..e87cc0320091 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -4887,7 +4887,6 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns,
>  
>  static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags)
>  {
> -	const unsigned long required_iflags = SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
>  	struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
>  	unsigned long s_iflags;
>  
> @@ -4899,9 +4898,13 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags
>  	if (!(s_iflags & SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE))
>  		return false;
>  
> -	if ((s_iflags & required_iflags) != required_iflags) {
> -		WARN_ONCE(1, "Expected s_iflags to contain 0x%lx\n",
> -			  required_iflags);
> +	if (!(s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC)) {
> +		WARN_ONCE(1, "Expected s_iflags to contain SB_I_NOEXEC\n");
> +		return true;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (!(s_iflags & (SB_I_NODEV | SB_I_MANAGED_DEVICES))) {
> +		WARN_ONCE(1, "Expected s_iflags to contain device access mask\n");
>  		return true;
>  	}
>  
> diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
> index 076392396e72..7b8098db17c9 100644
> --- a/fs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/super.c
> @@ -362,8 +362,10 @@ static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags,
>  	}
>  	s->s_bdi = &noop_backing_dev_info;
>  	s->s_flags = flags;
> -	if (s->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
> -		s->s_iflags |= SB_I_NODEV;
> +
> +	if (security_sb_device_access(s))
> +		goto fail;
> +
>  	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&s->s_instances);
>  	INIT_HLIST_BL_HEAD(&s->s_roots);
>  	mutex_init(&s->s_sync_lock);
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 98b7a7a8c42e..6ca0fe922478 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ extern int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fown);
>  #define SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE		0x00000010 /* fstype already mounted */
>  #define SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE	0x00000020
>  #define SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER		0x00000040
> +#define SB_I_MANAGED_DEVICES		0x00000080
>  
>  #define SB_I_SKIP_SYNC	0x00000100	/* Skip superblock at global sync */
>  #define SB_I_PERSB_BDI	0x00000200	/* has a per-sb bdi */
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 3fdd00b452ac..8c8a0d8aa71d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, fs_context_dup, struct fs_context *fc,
>  LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOPARAM, fs_context_parse_param, struct fs_context *fc,
>  	 struct fs_parameter *param)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_alloc_security, struct super_block *sb)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sb_device_access, struct super_block *sb)
>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sb_delete, struct super_block *sb)
>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sb_free_security, struct super_block *sb)
>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, sb_free_mnt_opts, void *mnt_opts)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 00809d2d5c38..a174f8c09594 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -155,6 +155,8 @@ extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  extern int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file);
>  int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>  		       const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
> +int cap_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
> +		    dev_t dev);
>  int cap_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>  			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
>  int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> @@ -348,6 +350,7 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>  int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
>  int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
>  int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev);
> +int security_sb_device_access(struct super_block *sb);
>  int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
>  			  struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
>  			  unsigned int flags);
> @@ -823,10 +826,16 @@ static inline int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -static inline int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir,
> -					struct dentry *dentry,
> -					int mode, dev_t dev)
> +static inline int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> +				       int mode, dev_t dev)
> +{
> +	return cap_inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_sb_device_access(struct super_block *sb)
>  {
> +	if (s->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
> +		sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NODEV;
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 8e8c630ce204..f4a208fdf939 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1438,6 +1438,24 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +int cap_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
> +		    dev_t dev)
> +{
> +	bool is_whiteout = S_ISCHR(mode) && dev == WHITEOUT_DEV;
> +	struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
> +	struct user_namespace *userns;
> +
> +	if (dir->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_MANAGED_DEVICES)
> +		userns = sb->s_user_ns;
> +	else
> +		userns = &init_user_ns;
> +	if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && !is_whiteout &&
> +	    !ns_capable(userns, CAP_MKNOD))
> +		return -EPERM;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> @@ -1448,6 +1466,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_from_file, cap_bprm_creds_from_file),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, cap_inode_mknod),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 088a79c35c26..192b992f1a34 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1221,6 +1221,28 @@ int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  
> +int security_sb_device_access(struct super_block *sb)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	rc = call_int_hook(sb_device_access, 0, sb);
> +	switch (rc) {
> +	case 0:
> +		/*
> +		 * LSM doesn't do device access management and this is an
> +		 * untrusted mount so block all device access.
> +		 */
> +		if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
> +			sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NODEV;
> +		return 0;
> +	case 1:
> +		sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_MANAGED_DEVICES;
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects
>   * @sb: filesystem superblock
> -- 
> 2.42.0
> 
> 

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