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Message-ID: <CAEjxPJ6zMbM5jPkLC_wDHsXWXofWcDntHRDWQTS6hojECVJPTw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 12:21:18 -0500
From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
To: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@...hat.com>
Cc: mst@...hat.com, jasowang@...hat.com, xuanzhuo@...ux.alibaba.com,
paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
eparis@...isplace.org, xieyongji@...edance.com,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
david.marchand@...hat.com, lulu@...hat.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 4/4] vduse: Add LSM hook to check Virtio device type
On Tue, Dec 12, 2023 at 8:17 AM Maxime Coquelin
<maxime.coquelin@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> This patch introduces a LSM hook for devices creation,
> destruction (ioctl()) and opening (open()) operations,
> checking the application is allowed to perform these
> operations for the Virtio device type.
Can you explain why the existing LSM hooks and SELinux implementation
are not sufficient? We already control the ability to open device
nodes via selinux_inode_permission() and selinux_file_open(), and can
support fine-grained per-cmd ioctl checking via selinux_file_ioctl().
And it should already be possible to label these nodes distinctly
through existing mechanisms (file_contexts if udev-created/labeled,
genfs_contexts if kernel-created). What exactly can't you do today
that this hook enables?
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